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Italy and migration 
Italy’s approach to migration is again under the spotlight as it has been 
in past times. It was then confronted with massive amounts of people 
fleeing their countries and aiming at the EU. Migration is part of Italy’s 
history, though not in the same vein as for other European countries. 
When countries such as Germany, UK or France were engaged with 
‘Gastarbeiter’ and naturalizing former colonies’ citizens, Italy was still 
largely an emigration country. The progressive shift into an immigra-
tion country has been recent. The Testo Unico, the key document on 
migration, was issued in 1998 at the end of a decade when Italy expe-
rienced massive inflows of asylum seekers (richiedenti asilo/‘pro-
fughi’) from the former Yugoslavia Republic. Surprisingly, the docu-
ment only scarcely addressed asylum matters, which instead found 
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proper treatment more recently with the transposition of European 
Regulations and Directives. This legislative void is all the more puz-
zling if one considers that the right of asylum has been fully ingrained 
in the Italian Constitution as follow: 
The Italian juridical system conforms to the norms generally 
recognized by the international law; The juridical situation of 
the foreigner is regulated by the law in conformity with norms 
and international treaties; The foreigner to whom the effective 
exercise of the democratic freedoms granted by the Italian Con-
stitution is impeded in his country, has the right of asylum in 
the Republic, according to the conditions established by the law; 
Extradition of the foreigner for political crimes is not permitted. 
(Costituzione della Repubblica Italiana 1947, art. 10) 
The timid approach toward asylum has sometimes been accompanied 
by an assertive approach in the realm of migration, especially as a con-
sequence of more or less artificial ‘emergencies’ that, albeit not re-
ported in the legislation, have informed important approaches to mi-
gration. The ‘Bossi-Fini’ law of 2002, as maintained by some of its crit-
ics, followed a specific philosophy, strongly characterized by the re-
striction of many rights, from entrance to  defence against expulsion, 
and decisions on asylum matters, running contrary to Article 13 of the 
Constitution (Zorzella 2002). Similarly, Law Decree 160/2008 has tried 
to redirect migration policy in unquestionable restrictive terms, by re-
stricting, for example, family reunification opportunities, both with 
reference to family members and to the economic capacity needed to 
exercise such right (Pastore 2008). Hence, in the period 2008-2011, the 
general approach was to associate migration to the preservation of 
‘public security’ (Renoldi e Savio 2008; Zorzella 2011), with a strongly 
controversial legislative output, (Law n°94 of 2009), establishing the 
crime of illegal entrance and permanence in the territory of the Repub-
lic (Savio 2009). Hence, ‘Irregularity’, became a crime (Peprino 2009). 
Terms, definitions and concepts: the peculiarities of the 
Italian case 
Even though aimed at regulating migration, the term ‘migrant’, ap-
pears very infrequently in the Testo Unico: the most used word is in fact 
‘foreign/alien’ (straniero). When the term ‘migration’ is employed, it 
is done so in order to assume a specific connotation, such as in the case 
of ‘clandestine immigration’ and ‘extra-communitarian immigration’. 
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These are terms which progressively became part of the national jar-
gon on migration to describe respectively irregular immigration and 
the inflow of persons from outside the then European Community, 
even though in the public debate, this term often overlaps with an un-
derstanding of the EU that predates the 2004 enlargement. While 
deeply employed in the law and by commentators, the term ‘clandes-
tine immigration’ has increasingly taken on a negative connotation to 
refer in particular to the ‘illegality’ surrounding undocumented mi-
grants entering Italy. Today, the term is scantly used, and essentially 
only by anti-immigration positions. 
In the same vein as the EU’s legislation and the legislation of EU’s 
Member States, the term ‘asylum seeker’ is generally not used, opting 
for a more neutral ‘applicant’. ‘International protection’ has substi-
tuted the restricted reference to ‘asylum’ to encompass different cate-
gories of protection defined by the EU, but also specific to the Italian 
case (humanitarian protection).  
Other terms employed (often for the first time) by the Italian legislation 
have raised great debate and criticisms by commentators, while allow-
ing an increasingly frequent recourse to the different Courts of the Ital-
ian system, both for interpretative and legitimacy purposes. That was 
the case, for example, with the introduction of Temporary Permanence 
Centers (Centri di Permanenza Temporanea) for the first time in 1998. 
The introduction of the centres was motivated by the necessity to better 
manage expulsions and to conform with other European states, where 
these centres were already operative (Nascimbene 2001; Einaudi 2007; 
Di Martino 2014). The centres raised a major debate on the logic and 
legitimacy of ‘administrative detention’ (detenzione amministrativa). 
It is worth to remember that that the European Convention on Human 
Rights envisages the possibility to deprive the liberty of the individual in 
case of ‘the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an 
unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is 
being taken with a view to deportation or extradition’ (Art. 5, C.1,f). 
The main controversy over the concept was that it allowed for the de-
tention (‘trattenimento’) of persons even in the absence of a penal 
crime. The concept implied the restriction of the personal liberty of mi-
grants, and it assumed a peculiar emphasis in Italy as it was in clear 
contrast with the Constitution (Art.13) (Savio 2015; Caputo 2000), 
which recites that ‘no form of detention, inspection, search nor other 
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restriction to personal freedom is allowed if not as a consequence of an 
act motivated by the judiciary authority and only in the cases and the 
modalities foreseen by the law’. Throughout time, though, these re-
strictions have been intended as key tools of the migration policy both 
by their supporters and promoters, as well as by their critics. This has 
been heightened when even more restrictive understandings of the 
term have been adopted by centre-right coalitions in 2002 and 2009, 
and when the possibility of ‘holding’ persons in open (but also closed) 
centres has been contemplated for asylum seekers. At the time of writ-
ing, and as a result of the increasing security threats to the EU, the Cen-
tres for identification and Expulsion have been upgraded anew as key 
instruments; something which inevitably puts the emphasis on other 
terms, such as ‘detention’, ‘expulsion’, and ‘irregular immigration’, 
and seems to re-propose a ‘migration-security’ nexus. 
The word ‘centres’ is extremely controversial in Italy,  as it recalls the 
idea of people to be kept in specific places and separated from the rest 
of the community. Along the same lines, it is to be noticed that there is 
a tension between the concepts of ‘trattenimento’ and ‘accoglienza’ as 
referred to asylum seekers: the Italian legislator has marked a differ-
ence between persons in CIE (close structures) and persons in other 
centres (CARA). As a matter of fact, ‘accoglienza’ has a slightly less 
aseptic and more positive flavour than ‘reception’, the English word 
used with respect to asylum seekers. 
Another concept particularly debated has been that of expulsion, 
which in the Italian legislation has been articulated in three different 
terms: push-back (‘respingimento’); expulsion with accompaniment to 
the frontier (‘espulsione con accompagnamento alla frontiera’); and ad-
ministrative axpulsion (‘espulsione amministrativa’), causing interpreta-
tive and practical confusion. The use of these specific terms by the legisla-
tor, and the emphasis on coercion, run contrary to a European approach 
who has firstly prioritized the ‘voluntary’ character of return. Also, commen-
tators have underlined that insistence on these concepts has been mainly an 
attempt at emphasizing a specific approach to the handling of migration: a 
punitive one rather than a regulative one (Casadonte and Di Bari 2002). 
The concepts of ‘residence contract’, ‘integration agreement’, ‘human-
itarian protection’, and ‘humanitarian corridors’ are also peculiar to 
the Italian case, and are discussed below. In fact, the section rests on a 
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preliminary evaluation of possible dimensions of justice. The term ‘com-
pact’ (‘migration compact’) is also worth mentioning, proposed by Italy as 
a ‘new approach’ to handle relations with third countries on migration, –  a 
concept that has been endorsed by the European Union discussing the New 
‘Partnership Frameworks’ with third countries as ‘Compacts’. 
Observations on the three understandings of justice from 
the Italian case 
Justice as non-domination 
While it is difficult at this stage to envisage acts of ‘domination’ em-
bodied in the terms and concepts of the Italian legislation, some ele-
ments are worth considering. 
For example, by linking the amount of quotas for workers to coopera-
tion on the fight against ‘clandestine immigration’ and on the effective 
readmission of irregular nationals, Italy has somehow exerted its influ-
ence on relations with specific countries through the concept of ‘de-
creto flussi’ (‘flow decree’). Thus, Italy has discriminated between 
countries by privileging those with whom effective cooperation on mi-
gration management was at play. 
While the concept of domination (non-domination) is likely to apply 
mostly in relations with third countries (of origin and transit), it is 
worth noticing how the concept of ‘hotspot’ has been perceived as ‘im-
posed’ in the Italian landscape as a measure to ensure the proper fin-
gerprinting of all migrants, while not taking in due account the fact 
that most of the migrants arriving in Italy were not eligible for reloca-
tion. Furthermore, the strict number of nationalities intrinsic to ‘relo-
cation’ will mean that these migrants will leave Italy, even though 
these are the most complex cases (Di Filippo 2015, 40). Hence, the in-
troduction of the concept of ‘hotspot’ in the Italian jargon may suggest 
a case of ‘domination’ from other Member States. 
Justice as impartiality 
In principle, the law should presuppose ‘impartiality’ (non-discrimi-
nation, also with reference to third citizens) as its raison d’être. How-
ever, traces of ‘discrimination’ are present in the Italian case. Mainly, 
these traces are embedded in the rights and obligations attached to spe-
cific categories of migrants. The same categorization effort does not 
only serve regulative purposes: additionally, it marks differences be-
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tween individuals in terms of their status as rightful claimants of jus-
tice. Thus, while respect for fundamental human rights cannot be ques-
tioned and should apply to all migrants (non-refoulement, right of asy-
lum, right of family life for example), these rights may sometimes be 
restricted for certain categories of migrants. 
A first observation regarding the Italian case is that, in a similar way 
as in the case of the EU’s legislation, permanence and the prospect for 
a stable or permanent residence in the territory of the Republic allows 
the granting of more rights. Also, the ‘regular’ residence of migrants is 
the precondition for sharing the same civil rights as Italian citizens. 
This is not to say that regular migrants’ rights perfectly match those of 
Italians, rather that irregularity is a rightless condition (aside from 
basic human rights such as emergency medical treatment), and that a 
rightless condition in no can way lead to the prospect of integration 
into the Italian society and system. 
That said, the ‘decreto flussi’ – the only regular access into the Republic 
– is in itself discriminatory as it provides the idea that only a certain 
number of persons is allowed entrance, and that these persons are ‘se-
lected’ among others. Indeed, there is only limited space left in this 
concept for an assertive role of migrants as bearer of specific claims 
(see below on mutual recognition). While it is assessed that regular mi-
grants enjoy more rights than irregular ones, some specifications are 
worth mentioning as they also are subject to discrimination. First, in 
the case of specific jobs, preference is given to Italian citizens and those 
of the European Union. Second, ‘the residence contract’ introduced by 
the Bossi-Fini law for dependent workers (but not for EU long-term 
residents) is a precondition for the issuing of the residence permit, and 
puts workers in a subjugated position with respect to their employer. 
Contrary to what the meaning of the word may suggest, ‘contract’ in 
fact denotes a term devoid of reciprocity, assuming domination traits 
(see mutual recognition below) (Zorzella 2011). 
While providing a minimum and basic understanding of family mem-
bers eligible for family reunification, the EU leaves space to Member 
States for optional positive interpretations. Many commentators have 
noticed that in Italy, family reunification has been progressively re-
stricted from its initial provision in 1998. In particular due to the Bossi-
Fini law and the Law decree 166/2008 leading to a pejorative situation 
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with respect to other Member States and the de facto closure of possible 
regular access into the Italian territory (Zorzella 2002; Pastore 2008). 
Beyond creating confusion, the proliferation in Italy of ‘labels’ for dif-
ferent centres (CDA, CARA, CIE, hotspot) has opened up space for 
‘discriminatory’ attitudes, as the creation of these centres leads to the 
establishment of ‘a special right for foreigners’ (Caputo 2000, 52). As 
evidenced by Marchetti, asylum seekers collected in different centres 
‘are divided in groups with different rights and opportunities’ (2015, 
167), even when the asylum seekers had the same juridical status. The 
lack of a clear juridical nature for the hotspots seems also to have an 
impact for rights claim. 
On the positive, with respect to the legislation of other Member States, 
the Italian Republic has tried to approximate the rights shared by per-
sons entitled to refugee status and those entitled of the status of sub-
sidiary protection (5 years is the duration of the residence permit in 
both cases, topping the rank set by the EU). However, subsidiary pro-
tection is still characterized by some restrictions. Also, while humani-
tarian protection is specific to Italy and is substantiated by the same 
Italian Constitution, the related residence permit only lasts two years 
and rights cannot be compared to the other forms of protection (for 
example, family reunification is not a possibility). As observable from 
statistics, amid a high degree of rejection of applications for the refugee 
and subsidiary protection status, the trend has brought with it a 
greater release of humanitarian protection residence permits. 
Finally, the ‘right of information’ has been particularly underlined in 
the Italian legislation (also for migrants in CIE), something which com-
plies both with an understanding of justice as ‘impartiality’ and ‘mu-
tual recognition’, given that rights as well as obligations deriving from 
their specific status should be known by every migrant, and given that 
in principle all migrants (even those in CIE) are informed of their right 
to apply for international protection, something which may satisfy self-
perception criteria. The hotspot approach, though, has been accused of 
denying migrants this fundamental right by not properly informing 
them on the possibility to apply for international protection (Zorzella 
2015; Morandi and Schiavone 2015). 
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Justice as mutual recognition 
The hotspot ‘system’, ‘area’, and ‘approach’ as it has been invariably 
labelled (suggesting possible interpretations this term may assume), 
opens more avenues for evaluation with respect to this third concept 
of justice. On the one hand, by automatically selecting people in clear 
need of international protection, it seems to recognize the particularly 
vulnerable situation of some migrants (Syrians, Eritreans and Iraqis) 
arrived in the last years in Italy, fleeing from wars and conflicts. On the 
other hand, this approach based on ‘nationality’, may side-line or post-
pone the concerns of other possible groups which equally perceive 
themselves as in need of protection. This consideration, indeed, is ex-
tendible to the EU more at large.  
Certainly, the Italian legislation is not devoid of terms which entail 
‘mutual recognition’ of migrants. Vulnerable persons are particularly 
given attention to (important is the recent introduction of victims of 
trafficking, genital mutilation, persons affected by serious illness, or 
mental disorders among the list of vulnerable persons (AIDA 2015)). 
According to the EU legislation, minors and unaccompanied minors 
(whose detention is prohibited in Italy) are particularly protected cat-
egories and their voices have to be taken into account (although in the 
case of unaccompanied minors Italy still lacks an organic law, which is 
currently under discussion). Reference to gender has also increased. 
The concept of ‘corridoi umanitari’ (‘human corridors’) is seemingly 
implying a peculiar attention to the needs of specific vulnerable per-
sons. Humanitarian residence permits refer to specific categories of 
persons not included in the EU ‘international protection’ understand-
ing. They are a further attempt to recognize the needs of these mi-
grants, and are released without proper identification documents, doc-
uments ascertaining sustenance capabilities, accommodation or suffi-
cient means to return to the origin country (Bonetti 2008) and can be 
conceded in the absence of a formal request for international protec-
tion. Seemingly, the SPRAR system for asylum seekers (the ‘second re-
ception tier’) has been believed to offer specific attention to the differ-
ent needs of its hosts (even though, the refugee crisis has seen a large 
recourse to emergency structures (CAS), that by definition entail emer-
gency measures which cannot take into account the singular exigencies 
of the persons present in the structures) (see Morandi and Schiavone 
2015). Moreover, social protection and emersion programmes are pe-
culiar measures of the Italian case, recognizing the specific needs of 
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certain migrants, such as victims of trafficking and violence. In partic-
ular, a victim does not only obtain a special residence permit, but has 
also access to emersion programmes (Giammarino 2000, 54). 
Finally, the concept of ‘integration’ is conceived to specifically take into 
account individuals’ peculiarities and identities – in particular to be 
cherished and promoted in the education system. However, this latter 
impression seems to be contradicted by another concept, namely that 
of ‘integration agreement’. If in principle the words ‘agreement’ and 
‘integration’ denote mutual reciprocity and consent (Zorzella 2011), 
they may in reality, as drafted by the Legislator, look like as an act of 
‘domination’ (or not recognition) of the migrants’ identity and peculi-
arities alongside an act of ‘discrimination’ (see the second concept of 
justice above) if one considers that the same agreement is not requested 
for the Italian citizens (Cuttitta 2016). 
France and migration 
As Gérard Noiriel explains, the ‘immigrant’ is in France a ‘republican 
invention’. It was not until the Third Republic that the concept started 
to circulate as part of the effort to govern a mobile working population 
(Noiriel 1988). After the end of the colonial empire, and most remark-
ably after the independence of Algeria, France had to face the presence 
of millions of foreigners from the former colonies. The high mobility 
with these countries gradually introduced a separation between work-
ers, students and trainees, and then linked family reunification to 
housing and other requirements (Sayad and Gilette 1984). Even after 
the independence of former colonies, the condition of particular na-
tional groups with historical links to France continued to be regulated 
with specific provisions, which partially waive from the general rule. 
This experience worked as a precedent for the future laws dealing with 
migration. 
The colonial past resulted also in a geographical stratification between 
‘metropolitan France’ (part of the Schengen space) and the five ‘over-
seas departments’ part of the European Union (Guadalupe, Marti-
nique, Guyane, La Réunion and Mayotte), plus other territories in-
cluded in the Republic. The law on immigration currently in force 
(CESEDA) considers France as the ensemble of ‘metropolitan France’, 
Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon, Saint-Barthélemy and Saint-Martin (Art. L111-3). 
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The crisis of the early 1970s marked the beginning of an approach 
where the release of a permit to stay is strictly related to a labour con-
tract, and the process of regularisation becomes more difficult. By the 
end of the decade immigration became a major political issue for social 
and political reasons and the period marked the rise of a new discourse 
and legislative activism based on the need to control (‘maitriser’) the 
fluxes of migrants. During the 1980s, more than 15 laws, dozens of de-
crees, and more than 200 circulars were emitted – a trend that contin-
ued in the 1990s with annual interventions that increased the norma-
tive cacophony on immigration. In the same period, the debate polar-
ized around the support for migrants’ rights and their right to stay 
through the regularisation of the ‘undocumeted’ (‘sans-papier’), and 
the effort to fight ‘clandestine immigration’. The alternation in govern-
ment marked several shift towards the first or the second position until 
the introduction of more draconian conditions that made it harsher to 
be a regular migrant in France and acquire nationality though the so-
called loi Pasqua-Debré (1986, 1993 and 1997). 
The general attitude towards migrants shifted between ‘integration’ 
and ‘assimilation’, reflected in the restriction of the jus soli from a semi-
automatic procedure to something that must be activated and requires 
formal obligations, floating between the call for more strictness and 
more humanity. But it is only behind this opposition that we can see 
an emerging rationality, linking migration to the economic and demo-
graphic needs of the country: an utilitarian vision that in the following 
year would produce a tension between the search of a comprehensive 
framework to regulate migration, and the adoption of a ‘case by case’ 
approach. This tension cuts across the distinction between regular and 
irregular migration, leading to a growing precarisation of the regular 
stay. Even when it came to asylum policy, the increase in the number 
of demands has been coupled with a decrease in the rate of admissions 
during the period 1970-2000, from 90 per cent to less than 20 per cent 
(Cornuau and Duzenat, 2008). Behind the declarations, the practical 
orientation of the state has been a restraint of the conditions for the 
admissibility and the acceptance of the demand – including the use of 
subsidiary protection, introduced in 2003 – as a way to recognize the 
menace to individual freedom, while at the same time recognising 
lower rights than the refugee status. 
The rise of Nicholas Sarkozy as the Minister of the Interior in 2002 and 
then as President of the Republic in 2007, can be seen both as a turning 
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point and as a formalization of a tendency already in place. The dis-
course on the ‘chosen immigration’ (‘immigration choisie’) openly af-
firmed the right of France to decide whom to accept inside its territory, 
and the goal of increasing a qualified economic migration over familial 
migration, representing the vast majority of new permits. More re-
cently, a number of reforms have been introduced, following what the 
Ministry of the Interior defines as ‘clear, republican and consensual’ 
principles: namely the improvement of reception of the regular immi-
grants; the attraction of talents and high qualified foreigners; and the 
strengthening of the contrast to irregular migration. On the other hand, 
new incriminations have been introduced for the foreigner who re-
fuses the collection of fingerprints or escapes from a detention centre. 
In 2004 the adoption of the Code of entry and residence of foreigners 
and the right to asylum – or CESEDA (Code de l’entrée et du séjour 
des étrangers et du droit d’asile) – systematized the different laws and 
provisions in the field into a single text. The CESEDA was lastly re-
formed in the sections regarding asylum on 23 July 2015, and in the 
sections relating to the entry and rights of foreigners on 7 March, 2016. 
Even if the reforms were partly intended to contrast the precarisation 
of the stay through the generalization of the multiannual permit (carte 
pluriannelle), this is not likely to happen due to harsher conditions and 
a stricter control (Gisti et. Al. 2017). 
Terms, definitions and concepts: peculiarities of the French 
case 
Recent statistics set the number of foreigners in France up to 4 million 
and the number of immigrants up to 7.5 million (Bouvier and Coirier 
2016). This distinction between the immigrant (‘immigré’) and the for-
eigner (‘étranger’) largely depends on the historic mobility of the peo-
ple from the former colonies. ‘Immigrant’ is a concept primarily related 
to the country of origin of the person and not their actual legal status 
in France, and is defined as ‘a person born foreigner abroad and resi-
dent in France’. The concept of ‘foreigner’ (‘étranger’) is, on the con-
trary, referred to the present nationality and legal status of a person. 
As defined by CESEDA, art. L111-1, the foreigners are ‘the people 
without French nationality, either if they have a foreign nationality or 
if they don’t have a nationality’. Following the law, if a person has mul-
tiple nationalities, including the French nationality, he/she is consid-
ered as French in France. 
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Consequently, the CESEDA never refers to ‘immigrant’, but only to 
‘foreigners’ and widely uses the word ‘ressortissant’, literally describ-
ing a foreign citizen out of his or her own country. The distinction be-
tween ‘étranger’ and ‘ressortissant’ is relevant as not all foreigners are 
‘ressortissant’, as in the case of the stateless people. The same law refers 
to ‘immigration’ in two ways: (i) when it mentions the name of the in-
stitutions dealing with the process, and (ii) when mentioning the ‘ir-
regular immigration’ (‘immigration irrégulière’). When dealing with 
the people without papers, the concept of ‘irregularity’ is used in ref-
erence to a ‘situation’ (‘situation’), such as ‘the foreigners in irregular 
situation’ (art. L111-10). The law never uses the word ‘clandestine’, 
which is by the way used by branches of the state to describe actions against 
‘clandestine immigration’. The law uses instead the word ‘migrant’ when 
referring to the activity of facilitating the irregular entry and stay in the 
country: such as the ‘illicit traffic of migrants’ (‘trafic illicite de migrants’); the 
projects of co-development (‘codéveloppement des migrants’); or the help to 
migrants (‘aide aux migrants’) (arts. L622-1, L900-1 and L316-1). 
The rationale behind the use of ‘irregular migration’ was explained in 
1998 by the commission of enquiry of the French Senate, Masson 
Balarello, on the issue of regularisation. The commission pointed out 
that the use of the term ‘irregular migration’ contradicted the idea – 
implicit in the term ‘sans-papiers’ (without papers) used by the grow-
ing movement pushing for a mass regularisation of migrants – ‘that the 
concerned persons are ‘victims’, somehow deprived of a right from the 
administration, while it concerns foreigners staying irregularly in 
France’ (Masson and Balarello 1998). 
Generally speaking, a ‘foreigner’ is a person who lacks a basic right 
recognised to French citizens: the right to enter and stay without con-
ditions in France. A foreigner regularly staying in France has the same 
rights as a French citizen with some exceptions: only the citizens of a 
EU Member State have the political rights, and only in the local and 
European elections; only the citizens of a European Union Member 
State, Norway, Iceland, Lichtenstein, Andorra, Monaco, and Switzer-
land have access to job positions in the public administration (excluded 
the so called ‘sovereign positions’ such as diplomacy, defence etc.); the 
non EU citizens can access the public administration only for jobs in 
the field of research and education; social benefits such as health insur-
ance, maternity leave and the likes are recognised depending on the 
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working position. A foreigner can participate in the social life, includ-
ing being elected as union representative, but they cannot be elected as 
members of the ‘conseils des prud’hommes’, a form of arbitration. 
On the side of international protection, two main categories exist in 
France: the status of refugee and the status of subsidiary protection. 
The sources of the definition of refugees and recipients of protection 
are basically three: the French Constitution; the Geneva Convention of 
1951; and the UNHCR, while the normative framework is included in 
the book VII of the CESEDA. The term ‘subsidiary’ means that this 
form of protection is recognised only after the evaluation of the criteria, 
in order to be acknowledged as a refugee. A third category, that does 
not directly imply a form of protection, but must be included in the 
picture, is that of ‘stateless person’. 
The Art. L711-1 of CESEDA states that the quality of refugee ‘is recog-
nised to all persons prosecuted in reason of their action in favour of 
liberty’, following the definition of the French constitution, as well as 
to ‘all persons under the mandate of the High Commission of the 
United Nations for the refugees, art. 6 and 7 of his statute as adopted 
by the General Assembly of the United Nations the 14 of December 
1950’, and the persons ‘who correspond to the definitions included in 
the first article of the Geneva convention on the status of refugees of 28 
July, 1951’. All these three categories are recipients of the dispositions 
‘applicable to refugees as for the Geneva convention’. The article L711-
2 specifies that the ‘reasons of prosecution’ are evaluated following the 
conditions included in the directive 2011/95/UE 13 December 2011, 
concerning the conditions under which a foreign citizen or a stateless 
person can be a recipient of international protection. It also specifies 
that the aspects in relation to gender and sexual orientation are taken 
into account for definition of social groups; that there must be a direct 
link between the reasons of persecution and specific acts or the lack of 
protection; and that it makes no difference if the subjects own the char-
acteristics that motivate the acts of persecution, or these are an assump-
tion of the perpetrator. 
The CESEDA describes the conditions to obtain a permit for ‘vie privée 
et familiale’ in different articles (see sub-section 6, Arts. L313-11 et seq), 
considering the family as the nuclear family: namely the couple – in-
cluding both marriage, cohabiting and the union through PACS (Pact 
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civil de solidarité, a civil union which provides also for the same sex un-
ions) – a relation between a parent and their sons. 
Observations on the three understandings of justice from 
the French case 
Justice as non-domination 
France is a powerful funding member of the EU and it is safe to say 
that its relation with the communitarian decision is performed in full 
autonomy. The compliance of France with the EU regulation comes to-
gether with the process of joint elaboration of these rules. The fact that 
France’s borders are mainly internal to the Schengen space keeps the 
state relatively distant from the main point of crisis of the last years. 
Nevertheless, the situation in Calais, where a bottleneck is created to 
stop migrants who wants to reach UK, and in Ventimiglia, where a 
similar bottleneck is created on the Italian side of the border to stop 
migrants who want to reach France, reveal how the distinction be-
tween external and internal borders in the EU is somehow misleading. 
If we consider the relocation system developed by the EU, France for-
mally committed itself to receiving its quota, but the slow implementation 
of the whole project is making this commitment too difficult to assess. 
On the other hand, France has historical and more recent bilateral re-
lations with many third countries. An overview of the agreements 
signed with these countries reveals a more complex situation. Here we 
can note that the rise of a discourse based on co-development has pro-
duced a situation where the political and the economic advantage of 
France towards the concerned third countries is used as a leverage to 
impose France’s own priorities. In particular, France has used this ad-
vantage to control irregular migration and govern mobility in a more 
efficient manner for its economic system. This point is particularly ev-
ident in the way bilateral agreements make development aids and the 
possibility to include avenues for workers of a specific country contin-
gent upon the commitment to readmit expelled migrants and to 
strengthen the control over irregular migration (Panizzon 2013). 
This sheds light on the fact that the relation of domination or no-dom-
ination between countries is grounded in a mutual relation of domina-
tion between these countries and the mobile population. 
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Justice as impartiality 
France has strong commitments to international law, affirmed in the 
CESEDA and in all the procedures regarding migration and asylum. 
The observations and limits concerning the international regime of 
protection of migrants and asylum seekers can thus be applied to 
France. Nevertheless, at least two dimensions point out a relevant spe-
cific position by France; namely, the definition of the list of labour 
shortages, and the list of ‘safe countries’ compiled by OFPRA (Office 
for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons). The definition of 
labour shortages responds to the priorities adopted by the EU’s strat-
egy to promote growth and employment within the context of the Eu-
rope 2020 strategy. The very reforms towards the ‘chosen immigration’ 
can be considered as part of the effort by France as a Member State to 
attract talent and skills ‘with a sectorial approach to legal migration 
and flexible admission mechanisms which respond to each State’s pri-
orities’ (EMN 2015: 8). Following these needs, the possibility for a for-
eigner to get a work permit in France depends upon two conditions: 
first, the definition of the specific occupations open depending on his 
nationality and, second, the employment situation criterion. In terms 
of justice, it is difficult to connect this kind of procedure with a cosmo-
politan idea and even less with ‘impartiality’, unless we define ‘impar-
tiality’ as a technical parameter for the efficiency of the labour market. 
The definition of ‘safe countries’ opens up a different set of problems. 
In fact, it opposes the principle of ‘impartiality’ as it imposes the na-
tional identity before any other consideration of the individual condi-
tion or danger of the concerned foreigner, allowing for speed rejection 
of the demand of asylum. The national list of  ‘safe countries’, first in-
troduced with the reform of 2003, first released in 2005 and lastly 
amended in 2015, has been criticised for accumulating on the EU lists 
following considerations that are difficult to discern. It is possible to 
note a certain correspondence between the list of ‘safe countries’ and 
some of the major sources of application in recent years, such as Ko-
sovo and Albania. The number of included countries – 16 – may seem 
both too low and too high. In any case, it is difficult to relate this list 
with some form of generally applicable impartiality. 
Justice as mutual recognition 
The French state has progressively introduced normative instruments 
to insure the integration of foreign nationals into the value system of 
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the ‘République’. The ‘Contract d’intégration républicaine’ (CIR, intro-
duced with the reform of CESEDA of 24 July 2006, in substitution of 
the ‘Contract d’accueil et intégration’) includes the obligation for the 
applicant not only to comply with the French law, but also ‘to respect 
the key values of French society and Republic’. In order to explain this 
passage of CIR, the French ministry of the Interior has drafted a docu-
ment titled ‘Living in France’. The document starts with the explana-
tion of the ‘key values of French Society and Republic’ and states that 
‘France is synonymous with fundamental values to which the French 
are very attached’ and that ‘living in France means having rights as 
well as obligations’ (General Directorate for Foreign Nationals in 
France 2016, 5). Independently from the values enlisted in this docu-
ment, the mere existence of CIR should be understood as a lack of mu-
tual recognition as it reflects a solution to the long debate over multi-
culturalism in the name of the supremacy of the ‘République’. 
A second and more general tension regarding mutual recognition is 
present concerning the fact that migrants are always considered as 
subject of a state. As the discourse on the ‘chosen immigration’ clearly 
shows, the main focus of the French policy on migration is to affirm 
this field as a state prerogative and interest. Even the compliance with 
international obligations comes as an indirect consequence of the 
French state engagement with the international community and its 
membership in the European Union. What is clear is that the French 
state, as a sovereign state, recognises the claim by foreign individuals 
of moving and living in its own territory only as a specific segment of 
labour force or a specific class of vulnerable people. This implies strong 
consequences for the European migration system, as it rests in a mid-
dle ground between being rooted in nation states and a supranational 
political formation. While the European Union seems to replicate the 
logic of nation states when it comes to migration at a different scale, 
critics such as the French philosopher Etienne Balibar suggested that 
Europe, as a hybrid entity, should open new paths for justice that are 
not rooted in the political logic of sovereignty (Balibar 2001; 2016). 
Germany and migration 
For decades, German policymakers and public dialogue perpetuated 
the perception that Germany was not a country of immigration, even 
as it was becoming one of the world’s top destinations (second only to 
the United States in recent years). Since the early 2000s, Germany has 
undergone a profound policy shift toward recognizing its status and 
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becoming a country that emphasizes the integration of newcomers and 
the recruitment of skilled labour migrants. This approach to immigra-
tion and immigrants has been tested, however, amid the massive humani-
tarian inflows that began in 2015, which have stoked heated debate. 
The current conceptual paradigm underlying the legal and institu-
tional framework of the national migration system is the one that 
emerged in the early 2000s, when Germany suited up to embrace – de-
spite reluctances, enduring inconsistencies and ongoing debates – its 
new identity as a country of immigration and integration. The coun-
try’s previous self-depiction was one that denied immigration and in-
tegration as part of its identity, despite the millions of Gastarbeiter, 
mostly unskilled labourers from Italy, Turkey, Spain, and Greece, that 
arrived in the economic boom years between 1955 and 1973. The 1970s 
economic slowdown as well as the partially unexpected inflow of asy-
lum seekers in the 80s and ethnic Germans in the 90s are the main rea-
sons of this stance. 
Terms, definitions and concepts: the peculiarities of the 
German case 
The complexity of German authorities’ approach to migration is re-
flected in the diverse range of only partially overlapping, if not poten-
tially contrasting, concepts to be found in official sources – a complex-
ity that is only enhanced by a public debate not always able or willing 
to keep up with subtleties. For instance, Migration and Migranten are 
essentially socio-scientific notions rather than technical terms pertain-
ing to the German Aufenthaltsrecht (residence law), yet they occur in 
legal sources quite frequently, also as an effect of German policymak-
ers’ participation in wider debates aimed at defining notions and tar-
geting vested biases recurring in common and specialist parlance 
(Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Migration, Flüchtlinge und In-
tegration 2014; Senge 2015; European Commission 2012). More rele-
vant, although not specifically defined in legal terms, is the concept of 
Zuwanderung – translated in the EMN-glossary as migration – which 
refers to the actual flow of people entering the country from abroad. 
The legal use of the term – after which the immigration law currently 
in force (Zewanderungsgesetz) is named – is relevant because it implies 
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the legal distinction between regular and irregular entry in the coun-
try.28 More specifically, Zuwanderung entails the authoritative regula-
tion of the movement of people leaving their homeland (Heimat) 
through the enforcement of entry requirements – that is, the active gov-
ernmental management of a policy issue. This notion therefore differs 
from the ostensibly ‘neutral’ notion of migration – although even the 
scientific term Migranten can come to unwarrantedly singling out ‘spe-
cial groups’, such as poor families with non-German backgrounds in 
need of social assistance. The use of the concept of Einwaderung – the 
willing relocation of people moving to a foreign country in need of additional 
population for demographic, economic, cultural or any other kind of reasons 
(Germany as Einwanderungsland) is highly indicative of the underlying polit-
ical conflict over the Germany’s general stance toward migration. 
Though virtually irrelevant in lexical terms, the linguistic difference 
between Zuwanderung – implicitly referring to unwanted and uncon-
trolled entry and the governance thereof – and Einwanderung – which 
entails permanent establishment and social integration – has been a 
crucial point of the debate over a new immigration act in Germany 
since the choice of either term would elicit a completely different per-
spective on the matter at issue. Oddly enough, the EMN translates Ein-
wanderung as irregular immigration (European Commission 2012). 
However, the very difference between insiders/citizens and outsid-
ers/aliens is to some extent strained by categories like that of 
Spätaussiedler (repatriated ethnic Germans) – German nationals (Volks-
zugehörige) from the successor states of the former Soviet Union and 
other Eastern European states, who have established their stay perma-
nently in Germany by means of a special admission procedure. 
Spätaussiedler’s special entitlement to naturalization (Einbürgerung) 
emphasizes even more Germany’s conditional and differentiated ap-
proach to citizenship as a means to integration. The meaning of Volks-
zugehörige has been adapted several times, especially with regard to the 
importance of German linguistic proficiency. The language tests car-
ried out since 1996 required the acquisition of German language skills 
through family mediation. Since 2013, knowledge acquired elsewhere 
has also been allowed, which has led to a growth in the circle of poten-
                                          
28 The term erlaubt (allowed) is also used. Referring to resolution 1509 (2006) of the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the term 'illegal' is preferred when 
referring to a status or process, whereas the term 'irregular' is preferred when referring 
to a person (Council 2006)  
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tial returnees. The German Constitution, Art. 116, also refer to Sta-
tusdeutscher (As-if-German) or German without German citizenship, 
i.e. refugees or expellees of German nationality or as their spouse or 
descendant in the territory of the German Reich according to the situ-
ation of 31 December 1937. Moreover, the Bundesvertriebenengesetzes 
granted special rights to the exiled and refugees in order to favour the 
naturalization of Jews who had to flee during the Third Reich’s rule or 
had been left outside of the post-WWII German national borders. 
Unsurprisingly, over the last few years, asylum policy and legislation 
have also been at the centre of intense public debates, often fuelled by 
more or less genuine conceptual misunderstandings. To this regard, 
the notion of Wirtschaftsflüchtlinge (economic refugee) is notable. This 
category includes anybody who enters the country irregularly and 
then applies as asylum seekers, although their motivation is to im-
prove their living conditions, and not to escape persecution in their 
country of origin. The concept’s negative connotation, as well as the 
openly unwarranted bridging of the distinction between migration 
and asylum, express quite effectively the tensions agitating the Ger-
man society and a certain intolerance of nuances. Among the sources 
of disagreement and misperceptions is the variance of the legal 
grounds for the status of refugee (Flüchlinge) can be granted to asylum 
seekers (Asylbewerber, Asylsuchende, the term Asylant is also in use, 
mostly with a derogatory connotation). Apart from the international 
instruments the country is signatory to, protection of the right to asy-
lum in Germany is also guaranteed by the Constitution (Deutche Bun-
destag 1949, 16a), although concretely the latter plays a subordinate 
role compared to the safeguard granted through the Geneva Conven-
tion (every year, only one to two per cent of asylum seekers receive 
protection based on the Constitution). 
Moreover, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), the 
Ministry of the Interior’s agency in charge of asylum procedures, also 
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assesses whether applicants meet the requirements for subsidiary pro-
tection29 and temporary suspensions of deportations30, or because their 
repatriation is technically impossible, but are eventually going to have 
to leave the country. Failed asylum seekers (abgelehnte Asylbewerber) – 
with no claim to any form of protection and no pending appeal – are 
requested to leave Germany within a week if the application is rejected 
because manifestly unfounded or immaterial, 30 day in all other cases. 
A failure to comply normally results in deportation (Abschiebung). This 
is therefore legally different from the notion of Zurückweisung (rejec-
tion at the border) – which correspond to border control practices exe-
cuted in places (basically airports) that are conceived as lying virtually 
outside of the German territory – since, in this case, the incoming alien 
does not even come to the asylum application. This is also part of the 
crackdown on asylum seekers and migration launched by the govern-
ment in 2016, at least in part as an effect of the widespread reprisal 
against the alleged ‘loss of control’ of the country’s borders. If a depor-
tation order is not immediately enforceable, detention pending depor-
tation (Abschiebungsgewahrsam) of asylum seekers is legally possible. 
Land-level authorities – the states foreigners’ registration offices 
(Ausländerbehörden) and administrative courts are in charge of depor-
tations and actual repatriations (as well as the issuing or withholding 
of residence permits and inspections enforcement).   
Observations on the three understandings of justice from 
the German case 
Justice as non-domination 
As it can be argued, the compliance of migration-related concepts and 
norms with a notion of justice as ‘inter-governmental fairness’ is trou-
bled by Germany’s somewhat ambivalent foreign policy identity. The 
foreign policy identity has been wavering more and more conspicu-
ously between a post-World World II repute as a non-threatening, 
highly reliable partner on the one hand and the (domestic as well as 
                                          
29 The protection afforded to a third-country national or to a stateless person who does 
not fulfil the conditions for recognition as a refugee but who has provided sound 
grounds for the assumption that returning to her/his country of origin or, in the case 
of a stateless person, to the country of her/his previous habitual residence would in 
fact be liable to cause serious harm according to Article 15, and that Articles 17(1) and 
(2) is not applicable and that s(he) cannot benefit from the protection of that country.  
30 Duldung, literally ‘toleration’, is not a residence title; those who are granted one 
(Geduldete) are tolerated for international or humanitarian reasons or for the protection 
of the interests of the Federal Republic of Germany (§ 60a (1) Aufenthgesetz).  
National case studies  107
 
international) expectations of a more assertive role, better suited to the 
country’s interests, capabilities and status on the other. This inherent 
tension manifests itself most clearly within the European Union, where 
a balance between formal equality with fellow Member States and the 
country’s de facto leading role seems increasingly hard to strike. 
As far as formal definitions and policy instruments are concerned, the 
very preference for the Zuvanderung concept can be regarded as con-
ducive to domination outcomes, inasmuch as it involves the suprem-
acy of domestic public authorities managing immigrants through more 
or less strict governmental strategies, while also indirectly – but delib-
erately – influencing their relative home countries. What seems to be 
implied here is a unilateral exertion of pressure at the expenses of the 
mutual relationship inherent in a notion that emphasizes long-term in-
tegration rather than an effective response to an emergency. As for in-
tra-EU relations, possible evidence of dominance may be found in the 
German government’s inherently unfair demand that the countries ly-
ing along the Union’s external borders act strictly in accordance with 
the terms of the Dublin III System – that is, that they  bear the brunt of 
the migration wave, with virtually no extra support from other Mem-
ber States. On the other hand, the unilateral suspension of the Dublin 
III System in September 2015, which triggered Central Europe govern-
ments’ allegations of ‘moral imperialism’ is worth a mention. Apart 
from any considerations about the EU asylum policy’s structural flaws 
and the poor performance of national reception systems, what matters 
here is that the German government’s request appears untenable in 
terms of a genuinely ‘Westphalian’ notion of justice, as it wittingly 
overlooks the concrete conditions faced by Southern Europe countries. 
In this sense, the opportunity to resort to effective means like the quasi-
extraterritorial fast-track asylum procedure carried out in the transit 
areas of major German airports creates an objective normative ad-
vantage for countries with no (sensitive) external border. In this sense, 
the respect of justice as non-domination requires more than the mere 
compliance with the principle of formal equality and mutual recogni-
tions among nation-states, but also presupposes the ‘diplomatic’ ability to 
manage the inevitable differences in power and material conditions. 
Justice as impartiality 
While Germany’s conceptual and legal frameworks tend to comply to 
a considerable extent with universal criteria of justice focused solely 
on the claims of individuals as such, they also continue to be bounded 
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by nation-specific considerations, for reasons that largely complement 
those discussed with reference to justice as non-domination. The very 
existence of forms of ‘quasi-citizenships’ based on ethnic identities 
and/or historical backgrounds (ethnic German repatriates, Jewish im-
migrants) generates a discriminatory effect in terms of access to inter-
national protection and naturalization on migrants. As far as economic 
migration is concerned, compliance with the universalistic jus soli prin-
ciple coexists with rules that request relinquishing the applicant’s orig-
inal citizenship in order to access the naturalization process. Moreover, 
specific measures have been taken to select labour force with the pur-
pose of addressing skills gaps (Fachkräftemangel) – see the implementa-
tion of the EU Blue Card system for highly qualified persons, which 
ensures a faster access to permanent residence. Significantly, the same 
rationale has been successfully applied to free movement of labour 
within the EU, creating an advantageous transfer of skilled workers 
from Southern Europe. Even when it comes to asylum, the application 
of universal rules has a number of conditions attached. Though they 
conform quite effectively to the rule of law and are relatively safe from 
the executive’s exclusive control, Germany’s criteria and procedures to 
grant protection to asylum seekers prove to be no less sensitive to con-
tingent concerns than cosmopolitan inspiration. Notably, Germany’s 
current asylum system was made possible by the so-called 1993 Asylkompro-
miss – a constitutional change to tighten the hitherto generous condition to 
access to the status of refugees in the wake of the 1980s increase in the inflows 
of asylum seekers, mainly from Yugoslavia, Romania and Bulgaria. 
Significantly, the concept of ‘safe country’ is not only at variance, as a 
criterion by which to assess asylum applications, with the pre-emi-
nence of individual over nationality-related concerns maintained by a 
notion of justice as impartiality, but it also periodically updated based 
on contingent considerations about the economic and political feasibil-
ity of Germany’s asylum policy. Another aspect that makes the Ger-
man asylum legislation less consistent with cosmopolitan values are 
the distinctive sets of safeguards granted by different forms of interna-
tional protection. Far from being a merely technical issue, the differ-
ences between the possible grounds based on which protection is ac-
tually granted have become a political case since the executive’s at-
tempt in 2016 to curtail the number of incoming Ausländer (foreigners) 
granting a larger share of asylum seekers subsidiary protection instead 
of the ‘full’ status of refugee. The measure was expected to discourage 
new arrivals, as subsidiary protection, while excluding deportation, 
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also comes with a two-year ban on the refugee’s family reunification 
and a speed up deportation process for those not provided with a per-
manent right to remain. The government’s crackdown on migration 
has resulted in a string of successful appeals before Germany’s admin-
istrative courts, which have ruled full protection for 90 percent of the 
claimants. Accordingly, national courts can be regarded as effective 
subsidiary enforcers of impartiality principles, attesting to the idea that 
the ‘checks and balances’ at work within Germany’s institutional set-
ting is functional to the advancement of justice as impartiality. But it also 
relates in a problematic way to the goal of promoting collective (suprana-
tional) institutions as default modes to pursue this notion of justice.  
Justice as mutual recognition 
Few aspects of Germany’s migration-related conceptual and legal 
frameworks seem to fulfil the criterion according to which specific in-
dividual and collective identities are to be addressed per se and not in 
relation to concerns about resources – which instead emerge as a rela-
tively high, albeit variable, priority of the country’s migration policies, 
as seen above. Admittedly, Germany’s migration system includes 
well-structured, nationally standardised integration courses (which 
may become mandatory under certain circumstances) primarily des-
tined for migrants with long-term residence plans in order to support 
them in integrating into the economic, cultural and social life. Signifi-
cantly, specific integration courses have been designed for special tar-
get groups: immigrants with additional advancement needs (e.g. par-
ents, women, and youths). The federal government’s commitment to-
ward this goal is confirmed by the ‘Integration bill’ submitted a few 
months ago, aimed at launching a ‘two-way process that would foster 
integration while expecting incomers to do their bit’ (The Federal Gov-
ernment 2016). One particular aspect consistent with the notion of jus-
tice as mutual recognition is the role assigned to stale-level entities, 
such as local Foreigners Authorities, which are responsible for issuing 
residence titles and are the primary location for questions regarding 
residency and taking up employment, creating more favourable con-
dition to a genuine dialogue. The role of the Länder’s registration of-
fices, responsible for administering deportations, and state courts, usu-
ally in charge of asylum seekers’ appeals is also significant. It was these 
authorities that ruled out deportations to Afghanistan, pending new 
security reports, despite the agreement signed by the EU and strongly 
advocated for by the federal government. 
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United Kingdom and migration 
The legislation regulating immigration and asylum in the UK is a rela-
tively complicated patchwork of Acts of Parliament and statutory in-
struments – executive orders of subordinate legislations (e.g. the Im-
migration Rules) expanding on and clarifying the framework of immi-
gration law. These have been emended at a very high rate over the past 
decades, in order to keep abreast with the massive changes occurred 
in this policy area. Although the United Kingdom has received immi-
grants for centuries, the country has traditionally been a net exporter 
of people; only from the mid-1980s did the United Kingdom become a 
country of immigration. The 1990s differs markedly because of high 
levels of net immigration, a surge generated in large part by sustained 
economic growth. Since 2004, immigration levels have been boosted 
by an extraordinary wave of mobility from Eastern European coun-
tries, particularly Poland, whose citizens have free movement and la-
bour rights following the European Union enlargement. The recent ref-
ugee crisis only added to an already very high level of public anxiety 
about immigration, fuelled by media attention. This has ultimately led 
to significant changes not only in the political agenda of traditional and 
new parties, but also in the very conceptual framework underlying the 
common notions of what is right and what is wrong regarding a force-
ful phenomenon as migration. 
Terms, definitions and concepts: peculiarities of the UK 
case 
The United Kingdom’s law offers no unambiguous and practicable 
definition of ‘migrant’ or ‘immigrant’ (‘Foreign’, for the purposes of 
the Control of Immigration means 'non-Commonwealth' to 1998 and 
'non-Commonwealth' and 'non-EEA' from 1999). The distinction be-
tween those who have the ‘right to abode’ in the UK and those who 
have not is crucial. The stock of migrants who are not entitled to reside 
in the UK, either because they have never had a legal residence permit 
or because they have overstayed their time-limited permit or who are 
legally resident but breaching the conditions attached to their immi-
gration status, are often referred to as ‘illegal immigrants’. The termi-
nology ‘irregular (im)migrant’/‘migrant in an irregular situation’ has 
come into use because it better covers the diversity of deviations from 
the law whilst avoiding any problematic moral statement (Düvell 
2014). The Immigration Act 1971 Section 24(1)(a) defines ‘illegal entry’ 
as the offence of knowingly entering the United Kingdom in breach of 
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a deportation order or without leave. For the offence to be committed, 
a person must knowingly enter in breach of a deportation order or with-
out leave (UK Legislation 1971). Labour migration involves people 
coming to the UK for the purpose of paid work – i.e. whose primary reason 
for migrating or legal permission to enter the UK is for employment. 
An ‘economic migrant’ is not a legal classification, but rather an um-
brella term for a wide array of people that move from one country to 
another to advance their economic and professional prospects. In the 
UK’s public discourse, what is meant by ‘economic migrant’ – often 
with a derogatory connotation if not a xenophobic twist – is a person 
who has left his/her own country and seeks by lawful or unlawful 
means to find employment – i.e. for ‘personal convenience’ possibly at 
the expenses of local workers – in another country (Althaus 2016). Con-
sider for example how the purportedly right-wing British think-tank 
Migration Watch states that ‘[i]n the majority of cases the unsuccessful 
asylum seeker is, in fact, an economic migrant who has tried to take 
advantage of the asylum system in the absence of any other available 
means of obtaining lawful entry into the United Kingdom. This con-
clusion is reinforced when one considers that most asylum seekers are 
young men. Furthermore, many of them have paid huge sums of 
money to people traffickers to bring them to the UK’ (Migration Watch 
UK 2006). The British Government also makes use of the term ‘migrant 
worker’ as formulated in the UN Convention on the Protection of the 
Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Family to desig-
nate a person engaged in a remunerated activity in a state of which he 
or she is not a national (Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights 1990; Department for Business Innovation & Skills, 2015). The 
UK, like most countries with advanced economies, has specific policies 
in place to facilitate the mobility of highly skilled professionals and in-
vestors into its respective national economy. The most desirable mi-
grants are identified as expatriates (‘expats’). Restriction and selection 
of labour, education and investment immigration is pursued through 
the implementation of the 5 Tier Points Based System (which implicitly 
differentiates the concept of labour immigrant). 
Someone who has received a positive decision on his or her asylum 
claim from the Home Office, or has had a successful appeal, is issued 
documents confirming his/her status as a refugee (UK Government 
2012, art. 334). Successful applicants gain support not only for them-
selves but also for their ‘dependents’ regardless of their immigration 
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status (who can be can be a husband/wife/civil partner, an unmarried 
couple (if living together for more than 2 of the last 3 years), a child 
under 18, or a member of the household who is over 18 and is in need 
of care and attention due to disability). If the Home Office considers 
that a person does not qualify for asylum, but is still in need of inter-
national protection, he/she may be granted Humanitarian Protection.  
The Home Office has the power to hold individuals in detention when 
exercising immigration control. Asylum seekers and other migrants 
can be detained for administrative purposes – typically to establish 
their identities, or to facilitate their immigration claims resolution 
and/or their removals. Although detention is not a criminal proce-
dure, observers frequently point to the prison-like features of immigra-
tion detention in the UK, including both architectural similarities and 
‘conceptual parities,’ which make it arguably a form of punishment 
even if officially it is not recognized as such. Decisions on asylum and 
human rights claims made in the UK are made by the UK Border 
Agency, which is an agency of the Home Office. In order to become an 
asylum applicant and be recognised as a refugee in Britain, migrants 
need to be on UK territory (so, strictly speaking the migrants in Calais 
are neither refugees or asylum seekers from a UK legal perspective – 
at least as long as they remain in French territory). The safe country of 
origin concept is provided by British legislation (Nationality Immigra-
tion and Asylum Act (UK Government 2002, 94)). States are designated 
safe by order of the Secretary of State for the Home Office. The Secre-
tary of State may make such an order where they are satisfied that 
‘there is in general in that State or part no serious risk of persecution 
of persons entitled to reside’ there, and that removal there ‘will not in 
general contravene’ the ECHR. The UK participates in EU and bilateral 
readmissions agreements, and has memoranda of understanding for 
the return of nationals found illegally in the UK.  
The term ‘deportation’ applies to people and their children whose re-
moval from the country is deemed ‘conducive to the public good’ by 
the Secretary of State. Deportation can also be recommended by a court 
in connection with a conviction of a criminal offence that carries a 
prison term. Administrative removals (or just ‘removals’) refers to a 
larger set of cases involving the enforced removal of non-citizens who 
have either entered the country illegally or deceptively, stayed in the 
country longer than their visa permitted, or otherwise violated the con-
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ditions of their leave to remain in the UK. Voluntary departures in-
volve people against whom enforced removal has been initiated. (The 
term ‘voluntary’ describes the method of departure rather than the 
choice of whether or not to depart).  
Observations on the three understandings of justice from 
the UK case 
Justice as non-domination 
Arguably, the basic ‘negative’ conception informed by the idea of jus-
tice as non-domination is the most discernible in the definitions and 
sets of relevant norms underlying the UK’s migration policy. British 
norms and operationalized concepts seem to be directed to large extent 
against arbitrary interference and the subordination to others, favour-
ing the rule of law and counter-majoritarian institutions – as the judi-
ciary’s power to assess the liability of every public authority (political 
and administrative) established through the Human Rights Act 1998. 
The purpose of holding in check the power of individuals and non-
state groups is at least in principle pursued through the protection of 
the right of irregular immigrants, especially when employed not qua 
immigrants but as part of the country’s population. On the other hand, 
this purpose inherently at variance with that of preventing and eradi-
cating irregular (‘illegal’) situations – see the new 2015 measures 
against landlords renting to irregular migrants – which can still be as-
sociated with non-domination through the role of the government as 
gatekeeper on the membership to the ‘body politic’, watching over a 
plain field where all insiders enjoy the same ‘right to have right’ that 
comes with citizenship (or, at least, border clearance).  
As for non-domination within the international context, the British 
government’s conceptual framework appears quite consistent with a 
Westphalian notion of justice – that is, a procedural rather than a sub-
stantial idea of justice, one in which the role of global institutions is to 
foster deliberation and promote common practical reasons rather than 
sanction non-compliance in a legal fashion. In this perspective, the way 
migration is defined and regulated is contingent on national interests 
– first of all security interests. Accordingly, freedom of movement and 
hospitality duties could be rightly constrained or conditioned based on 
the primary goal of national security. The decision not to be automati-
cally bound by measures taken under the Schengen acquis (but to re-
tain a right to opt-in) can be regarded as being in line with this practical 
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conception of justice – although it put a strain on the on the strong 
principle of equality that ‘qualifies’ strict non-domination among the 
EU Member States. As long as the natural configuration of the country 
offered a better and less intrusive way to prevent illegal immigration 
than other measures, such as Schengen’s, it was reasonable – therefore 
right – to stick to national norms and the respective concepts. Migra-
tion laws and, even more so, border control rules have rested on an 
ever-stronger notion of ‘territoriality’, which in turn hinges on the UK 
being an island (UK Government 2014). Arguably, this seems to have 
relieved the UK’s public authorities, compared to continental Eu-
rope’s, from conceptualising immigration an inherently global issue, 
to be reckoned with through novel mind-sets and institutional tools.  
Potential and actual infringements of the principle of non-domination 
are to be found in the EU readmission agreements and the bilateral 
memoranda of understanding for irregular migrants the UK partakes 
to, owing to asymmetries in the parties’ bargaining power. However, 
any specific measure aimed at curtailing migration can end up being 
perceived by other countries’ government as unfair treatment of their 
national abroad (as in the case with India and the British government’s 
and the scrapping of post-study work visa). The post-Brexit UK’s goal 
of retaining access to the EU internal market while dismissing the free-
dom of movement (and of migration) of EU citizens can also be regarded 
as an attempt to dominate relationships with former EU fellow members.  
Justice as impartiality 
Looking at the UK’s regulatory approach of migration and asylum, a 
major source of potential and actual infringements of the principle of 
impartiality – hinging on the idea of general/universal rights of indi-
viduals and collective entities – is the role assigned to Immigration 
Rules as a source of law, which attest to the post-statutory phase of the 
UK’s immigration policy (Cerna and Wietholtz 2011, 204). While a part 
of the British legal order – being de jure statutory instruments and hav-
ing been able to curb the Parliament’s sway – Immigration Rules are in 
fact non-legislated ‘rules of practice’, not bound to be abstract or gen-
eral, as required instead of statutory law. This has allowed the Home 
Office to regulate a great many aspects of the British immigration pol-
icy at its complete discretion. Being extremely flexible tools for the 
‘loophole-closing’ and ‘fine-tuning’ that has characterised the British 
legislative approach, Immigration Rules have been very much at odds 
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with the principles of justice as impartiality. Moreover, unlike in an-
other countries, the latter have been put under considerable strain by 
policy instruments designed to select immigrants based on their pro-
fessional qualification in order to fill gaps in the national labour market  
such as the 5 Tier Point System, which provides for ‘fast track’ proce-
dures for highly qualified migrants, sponsorship systems, et cetera.  
Also the concept of ‘safe countries of origin’ (defined in Nationality 
Immigration and Asylum Act (UK Government 2002, 94)) may be in-
consistent with the principles underlying impartiality, at least to the 
extent that its use is prompted by the desire to speed up the processing 
of asylum seekers’ applications, rather than ascertaining – in a virtually 
unbiased and selfless manner – that ‘there is in general in that State (of 
origin) or part no serious risk of persecution of persons entitled to re-
side’ there, and that removal there ‘will not in general contravene’ the 
European Convention on Human Rights (in this case there also seems 
to be a merely instrumental implementation of the ECHR). On the 
other hand, regardless of a tendency to criminalize irregular immigra-
tion, a series of measures – i.e. the direct enforceability of the ECHR 
via the Human Rights Act 1998 – have also provided for an effective 
protection in the UK of the universal rights of immigrants despite their 
irregular status. The UK ensures quite effectively that the basic rights 
of irregular immigrants cannot be violated in the enforcement of im-
migration laws and the implementation of measures to control migra-
tion, also when it comes to the delicate issue of deportation. 
Justice as mutual recognition 
The declared goal of the Immigration Act 2014’s – as stated by the then 
home secretary May – to ‘create a really hostile environment for illegal 
immigrants’ may well be regarded as a token of the UK’s conceptual 
and legislative attitude toward mutual recognition concerning migra-
tion (Travis 2013). Another publicized goal of recent years’ migration 
laws and policy measures is quite revealing: the so-called ‘net migra-
tion-target’, i.e. the intent to reduce net migration to the UK from EU 
and non-EU countries from hundreds to tens of thousands per year 
(Sims 2016). Both purposes reveal a marked ‘managerial’ underlying 
stance according to which migrants (as well as asylum seekers) seem 
to be primarily conceived of as a policy issue, to be managed with gov-
ernmental tools as effectively and in line with overarching national in-
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terests as possible. As one can see, such an  approach  is only margin-
ally based on aspects like ‘dialogue’ and ‘reciprocity’, as it rather as-
sumes the policy object to be essentially passive. 
This is confirmed, among others, by the rationale of the UK’s naturali-
zation’s rule. Not unlike in other countries, foreigners that wish to be-
come British citizens have to demonstrate to know and be able to join 
values and principles, history and culture as well as the law of the UK, 
besides mastering the English language and being willing to get in-
volved in the community life. The process, however, is not designed as 
a voluntary adhesion to fundamental features of the British citizenship 
premised on the mutual recognition of the recipient political commu-
nity (represented by the public authority) on the one hand and the cit-
izen-to-be on the other. Instead, the process resembles much more a 
bureaucratic scrutiny of requirements by the UK Visa Bureau – and 
basically the same goes for the ascertainment of the commitment to the 
country preliminary to the grant or refusal of Indefinite Leave to Re-
main or temporary visa. In this sense, the different requirements ap-
plied to people from inside the European Economic Area appear just 
the entailment of specific bureaucratic conditions rather than the ac-
knowledgment of actual identifying aspects. 
This is also in line with the process of ‘normalisation’ undergone by 
the UK’s national identity, which over the last three decades has been 
progressively rationalised through the removal of special rights and 
conditions to abode formerly assigned to specific categories of people 
based on their ties to the British Empire and then the Commonwealth, 
and a widespread negative evaluation of the multicultural integration 
strategy’s results (Platt and Platt 2013). A certain UK disinclination to 
justice as mutual recognition can also be detected, as regarding asy-
lum, in the British legal system of the third-country system, which fur-
ther exempts the Home Office from the obligation of dealing with a 
number of asylum requests, shifting the burden on the countries of 
‘safe arrival’ unilaterally designed by the Home Office. Moreover, un-
like with repatriations to the country of origin, the return to third safe 
countries cannot be appealed to by asylum seekers. Although the same 
‘buck-passing’ is to be found within Dublin III System too, at least in 
principle this can be thought of as the undesired outcome of a struc-
turally flawed (but still value-laden) common policy, whereas the 
functional equivalent implemented by the UK government permits to 
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avoid any ‘significant’ encounter with the asylum applicant without so 
much as the admittedly faulty ‘peer pressure’ operating within the EU. 
Greece and migration 
Greece is a relatively ‘new’ country of immigration since it was trans-
formed into a country of transit and settlement in the 1990s (Gropas 
and Triandafyllidou 2007; Kasimis 2012). Until then it was predomi-
nantly a country of emigration. Although small numbers of immi-
grants arrived in Greece in the 1970s and 1980s, significant numbers of 
migrants from the former Soviet Union republics and Balkan countries 
settled in Greece following political and economic unrest after the col-
lapse of communist regimes. These flows also included ethnically 
Greek returning migrants, such as members of the Greek minority in 
Albania and Greek post-civil war refugees in Eastern European com-
munist states (Gropas and Triandafyllidou 2007). In addition, because 
of its geographical position, Greece is a main point of entry to the Eu-
ropean Union for migrants from Asian, Middle Eastern and African 
countries fleeing armed conflict and political and economic instability 
(Triandafyllidou and Maroukis 2012), recently including Syrian refu-
gees displaced by the Syrian conflict (UNHCR 2016a).  
Several legislative instruments were introduced to address the new dy-
namics of migration. Law 1975 of 1991 was a first attempt to regulate 
the entry and residence and was followed by law 2910 in 2001. Both 
laws were predominantly focused on controlling entry and considered 
economic migration as temporary.  These tendencies are also evident 
in Law 3386 of 2005 which, however, attempted to provide for long-
term residence and integration (Baldwin-Edwards 2009; Triandafylli-
dou 2009). Nevertheless, migrants faced significant difficulties in 
maintaining legal status because of strict provisions on entry and resi-
dence and work permits and administrative inadequacies (Triandafyl-
lidou 2009; Maroukis 2013). As a result, four regularisation programs took 
place between 1997 and 2007 (Baldwin-Edwards 2009). The provisions of 
Law 3386/2005, subsequent amendments and other laws transposing EU 
directives – for instance on family reunification and long term residence 
status – were codified in Law 4251/2014 (Government Gazette 2005; 2014).  
The first law specifically on refugee protection was introduced in 1996. 
It established normal and accelerated procedures and introduced the 
concepts of manifestly unfounded applications and safe third-country 
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in line with developments in EU soft law. The Europeanisation of ref-
ugee and asylum law accelerated in the late 2000s with the transposi-
tion of the Dublin Regulation (2003) and the Reception (2007), Proce-
dures (2008) and Qualifications (2008) directives. Following wide-
spread criticisms on the country’s asylum and reception systems, Law 
3907/2011 introduced significant reforms – establishing the Asylum 
and First Reception Services – and transposed the Returns Directive 
(Government Gazette 2011). In 2016, Law 4375/2016 introduced 
amendments to the asylum and reception systems aimed at facilitating the 
implementation of the EU-Turkey agreement (Government Gazette 2016).  
Greece has also ratified key international and regional human rights 
instruments – including the Geneva Convention, the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights, International Covenant of Social, Economic 
and Cultural Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights – which safeguard the human rights of migrants. In addition, 
the Greek Constitution prohibits the ‘extradition of aliens prosecuted 
for their action as freedom-fighters’ and guarantees the ‘protection of 
their life, honour and liberty’ of every person in Greek territory ‘irre-
spective of nationality, race or language and of religious or political 
beliefs’ (Hellenic Parliament 2001, Art 5, para. 2). It also guarantees 
equal access to social security for all persons working in Greece. Overall, the 
Greek legal framework largely conforms to international and regional legal 
standards, although specific definitions and categories diverge on occasion. 
Terms, definitions and concepts: the peculiarities of the 
Greek case 
The term ‘migrant’ is not used in Greek law. Current law uses the 
terms: ‘foreign national’ (‘allodapos’), defined as ‘natural person who 
does not have Greek nationality or is stateless’; ‘third-country na-
tional’, defined as ‘any natural person who is not a Greek national or 
the national of any other EU Member State’; and ‘EU national’, defined 
as ‘any person who is a national of an EU Member State’ (Government 
Gazette 2005; 2014). Similarly, while the term ‘illegal immigrant’ –
‘lathrometanasths’ or ‘paranomos metanastis’ – is not used in Greek 
law, the term ‘illegal immigration’ (‘paranomi metanastefsi’) occasion-
ally is (EMN 2014). With reference to illegality, the law distinguishes 
between third-country nationals who ‘reside legally’ on the one hand 
and those who or ‘reside illegally’ or have ‘entered illegally’. However, 
the terms ‘migrant’, ‘economic migrant’, ‘economic migration’ and ‘il-
legal immigration’ has been used in official documents such as reports 
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submitted to UN or EU bodies, press releases by the government and 
ministries and parliamentary debates.  
The definitions of ‘refugee’ ‘refugee status’ and ‘subsidiary protection’ 
are identical to those in the Geneva Convention and EU directives on 
qualification and procedures (Government Gazette 2013; 2016). The 
terms ‘applicant for international protection’ or ‘applicant for asylum’ 
– are used in law to signify asylum seekers (Government Gazette 2016, 
Art. 34; 2014, Art. 2; 2010, Art. 2). Other legal definitions and categories 
in domestic law – such as ‘safe third-country’ ‘return’ ‘family reunifi-
cation’ ‘unaccompanied minors’ - generally transpose their equiva-
lents from EU legal instruments. There are, however, occasional differ-
ences between domestic and EU legal norms. For instance, when Law 
3907/2011 transposed the Returns directive, migrants ‘apprehended or 
intercepted by the competent authorities in connection with the irreg-
ular crossing by land, sea or air of the external border’ (European Par-
liament and Council 2008, Art. 2, par. 2a; Government Gazette 2011, 
Art. 17 par 2a) were excluded from its remit.  The text of the directive 
leaves the choice to include migrants apprehended at the border to the 
discretion of member states (European Parliament and Council 2008, 
Art 2). Similarly, there is no list of designated safe third countries in 
Greek law.  
Migration has generally been a controversial issue in Greece. The use 
of the terms ‘illegal immigrant’ and ‘illegal immigration’ is particularly 
significant in the Greek context since it has framed media and public 
debates on migration since the 1990s (Karamanidou 2016; Pavlou 
2009). Their widespread use constructed migration as a predominantly 
negative phenomenon, associated with criminality and social threat. 
The significance of ‘illegality’ is also evident in legislation which pri-
oritises control and deterrence over refugee protection or long-term in-
tegration. For instance, migrants entering the country in an unauthor-
ised manner are labelled as ‘illegal’ upon entry to Greek territory in 
accordance to the provisions of Law 3386/2005, even if they intent to 
apply for asylum. As will be discussed further on, this has significant 
consequences for migrants’ rights.  
Another significant feature of the Greek legal framework concerns dis-
parities in terms of rights attached to different legal categories. While 
essential human rights are generally guaranteed, socio-economic and 
civil right are dependent both on legal status and employment. This 
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often results in markedly different arrangements in relation to rights 
attached to different statuses. Recognised refugees, for instance, are 
given the full range of rights prescribed by the Qualifications directive. 
Third-country nationals generally have access to socio-economic 
rights, but it is legal residence and employment that guarantees most 
welfare entitlements (Government Gazette 2014; Maroukis 2013). In 
contrast, undocumented migrants are only entitled to emergency 
healthcare and use of public services relating to matters such as volun-
tary return and renewal of residence permits (Government Gazette 
2005, Art. 82; 2014, Art. 26). 
Key controversies relating to legislation between 2009 and 2016 con-
cerned citizenship, violence against migrants, and more recently on the 
Syrian refugee crisis and the EU-Turkey agreement. In 2010, the gov-
ernment introduced law 3838/2010 which facilitated the granting of 
citizenship to migrants and granted the right to vote in local elections. 
The law challenged dominant exclusionary perceptions of ethnic citi-
zenship, which was opposed by right-wing parties, and eventually de-
clared unconstitutional by the Greek Supreme Court.  Incidents of vi-
olence against migrants, linked to the extreme right party of Golden 
Dawn, highlighted the shortcomings of anti-discrimination legislation 
and attracted widespread criticism by human rights organisation 
(Council of Europe 2013). The adoption of the hotspot approach in 
2015, the EU-Turkey agreement and the introduction of Law 
4375/2016 brought on significant and controversial changes to the 
country’s asylum laws, most notably in relation to the application of 
the concept of ‘safe third-country’, detention of migrants in need of in-
ternational protection in closed Reception and Identification Centres 
and their return to Turkey. 
Observations on the three understandings of justice from 
the Greek case 
Justice as non-domination 
If justice as non-domination is conceptually located in relations be-
tween EU member states on the one hand and third countries on the 
other, it appears difficult to relate to the Greek context. There is little 
evidence that the Greek state has imposed migration-related measures 
on third states as an independent actor. For example, while Greece has 
bilateral readmission agreements with neighbouring states such as 
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Turkey, most are EU-wide ones (EMN 2014). A more pertinent ap-
proach would consider the extent to which Greek legal frameworks 
and practices are dominated by the European Union and other mem-
ber states. The Europeanisation of domestic migration and asylum 
laws and harmonisation with EU legislative developments is an out-
come of the country’s membership, but it has not always served its interests 
nor safeguarded migrants’ human rights. The Dublin Regulation, for ex-
ample, exacerbated pressures on already weak asylum and reception 
systems (Karamanidou and Schuster 2012; McDonough and Tsourdi 2012) 
before the suspension of returns to Greece following the MSS v Belgium and 
Greece judgement of the European Court of Human Rights and the EC-4/11 
and EC-411/10 judgments of the European Court of Justice.  
The management of the 2015 refugee crisis further illustrated these ten-
sions. The hotspot approach and the EU-Turkey agreement resulted in 
migrants being contained in Greece in order to facilitate return to Tur-
key and placed disproportionate pressures on the Greek border con-
trol, asylum and reception systems (AI 2016a; ECRE 2016a). At the 
same time, policies aimed at alleviating pressure in Greece, such as 
support by EASO and FRONTEX personnel, relocations of asylum 
seekers to other EU states and financial assistance have proved insuf-
ficient in addressing the challenged posed by the intensity of refugee 
and migration flows (AI 2016a). It is thus questionable whether the 
hotspot approach and the EU-Turkey agreement adhere to the princi-
ple of non-domination, since they do not appear to take into account 
the interests of the Greek state. 
Justice as impartiality 
The principle of justice as impartiality suggests that human rights 
norms are applied to all migrants equitably and requires states to avoid 
causing harm in the sense of putting migrants in situations where their 
basic human rights of migrants are violated (Eriksen 2016).  Serious 
harm, defined as facing the death penalty or execution, torture or in-
human or degrading treatment or punishment, or serious and individ-
ual threat by indiscriminate violence in international or internal armed 
conflict, is a key concept in both European and Greek law (Council 
2014(a), Art. 15; Government Gazette 2013, Art. 2). The Greek legal or-
der, however, gives rise to several categorisations that appear not to 
adhere to the principle of impartiality and that are likely to expose mi-
grants to serious harm. 
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First, the designation of migrants as ‘illegal’ upon entry, while rooted 
in law, risks causing harm to migrants because of potential exclusion 
from the asylum procedure and the possibility of refoulement to a 
country with insufficient protection safeguards.  By being labelled ‘il-
legal’, migrants are placed under the remit of the provisions of Law 
3386/2005 on unauthorised entry, which allow for their detention and 
return. If entering through the Greek-Turkish borders, the Readmis-
sion Agreement between the two countries allows the Greek authori-
ties to initiate the immediate return to Turkey (Government Gazette 
2002).  While the implementation of the Readmission Agreement has 
not been successful (EMN 2014), the legal context it established has al-
lowed for practices of both informal and formal return mainly to Tur-
key (AI 2010a; 2014). In addition, labelling migrants entering Greece as 
‘illegal’ rendered access to the asylum procedure problematic because 
it excludes them at the point of entry from legal provisions on recep-
tion and asylum procedures.  
Second, access to the asylum procedure and international protection 
was further complicated by considering Turkey a ‘first country of asy-
lum’ for Syrian nationals and ‘safe third-country’ for migrants of other 
nationalities following the EU- Turkey agreement (UNHCR 2016b). On 
this basis, most applications by Syrian, Afghani and Iraqi nationals 
have been declared inadmissible (Greek Asylum Service 2016a; ECRE 
2016) and not examined in their substance. The blanket application of 
the safe third-country concept contradicts the requirement for individ-
ual assessment of the circumstances of each application (ECRE 2016b; 
UNHCR 2016b) and increases the risk of refoulement. There are also 
serious doubts on whether Turkey is in practice a safe country, given 
that instances of chain-refoulement to unsafe countries of origin or 
transit have been recorded both before and after the EU-Turkey agree-
ment (AI 2010b; 2016b). Therefore the application of the ‘safe third-
country’ concept increases the risk of harm and thus may not adhere 
to conceptions of justice as impartiality.   
Third, recognition rates in Greece have been historically very low in 
comparison to the EU average, despite an increase after the establish-
ment of the Asylum Service in June 2013. For instance, recognition rate 
in 2012 was 0.8 percent compared to the EU average of 25 percent and 
in 2014 14 percent compared to 33 percent (European Stability Initia-
tive 2015; Greek Asylum Service 2016a). Given that the Common Eu-
ropean Asylum System entails the harmonisation of both definitions 
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and procedures for examining and deciding on asylum applications, 
the significantly lower recognition rate in Greece suggests that legal 
categories are interpreted in a more restrictive manner than other in 
other member states and therefore not compatible with the principle 
of impartiality. It could further suggest a degree of arbitrariness 
(Eriksen 2016) contrary to conceptions of justice as non-domination.  
Fourth, domestic law on occasion accords rights in a manner that does 
not adhere to the principles of equality and impartiality. For instance, 
legally resident third-country nationals and recognised refugees are el-
igible for family reunification, but recipients of subsidiary and tempo-
rary protection and humanitarian status are not (Kasapi 2016). Refu-
gees can also be unified with a broader range of family members than 
legally resident third-country nationals, even if this only applies for 
three months following recognition (Government Gazette 2008; 2014). 
Similarly, unaccompanied minors with refugee status have full access 
to mainstream education, while those in detention do not. Further, do-
mestic law differentiates between ethnically Greek migrants (‘omoge-
neis’) and non-ethnically Greek foreign nationals. For instance, 
spouses of ‘omogeneis’ entering Greece through the family reunifica-
tion procedure can obtain a residence permit for five years compared 
to the maximum of three years proscribed for long-term residents 
(Government Gazette 2014, Art. 71, 81). These arrangements suggest 
that access to human rights is not equal or impartial, but negotiated by legal 
definitions as well as by nationality and migrant status (Morris 2012).  
Justice as mutual recognition 
Greek legislation on asylum and immigration recognises, to an extent, 
the specific identities of migrants through the category of ‘vulnerable 
groups’. This category includes unaccompanied minors, persons who 
have a disability or an incurable or serious illness, the elderly,  women 
in pregnancy or having recently given birth, single parents with minor 
children, victims of torture, rape or other serious forms of psychologi-
cal, physical or sexual violence or exploitation, victims of trafficking in 
human beings, and persons with a post-traumatic disorder, in particu-
larly survivors and relatives of victims of ship-wrecks, a sub-category 
added in Law 4375/2016. In relation to reception, individual belonging 
to vulnerable groups are entitled to special care, socio-psychological 
support and medical treatment (Government Gazette 2007; 2011; 2016, 
Art. 14). In the case of hotspots, the Director of Reception and Identifi-
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cation centres can transfer unaccompanied minors and those belong-
ing to a vulnerable group to a Reception and identification Centre lo-
cated inland or to other appropriate structures (Government Gazette 
2016, Art. 15). In addition, asylum applications by individuals belong-
ing to vulnerable groups should be examined by priority, and case-
workers conducting interviews should have training on the specialised 
needs of women, children, and victims of violence and torture who ap-
ply for asylum (Government Gazette 2016, Art. 52). Women applicants, 
in particular, can request to be interviewed by women caseworkers and 
with the aid of female interpreters (Government Gazette 2016, Art. 52). 
However, other legal categories and definitions interfere with the 
recognition of specific identities and vulnerabilities. While the trans-
posed Procedures Directives of 2005 and 2013 state that the detention 
of asylum seekers should be exceptional and advise against the deten-
tion of unaccompanied minors and pregnant women (Government Ga-
zette 2016, Art. 46) the blanket application of illegality upon entry to 
Greek territory and provisions relating to hotspots have allowed for 
the detention of vulnerable groups (FRA 2011; AI 2016). Similarly, the 
detention of individual belonging to vulnerable groups under return 
procedures is permitted (Government Gazette 2011). In addition, the 
application of the safe third countries concept can be interpreted as 
challenging conceptions of justice as mutual recognition, since Turkey 
is considered safe without regard to the specific identities and experi-
ences of individual asylum seekers.   
A further arrangement that runs counter to justice as mutual recogni-
tion concerns the selection of asylum applicants for relocation is made 
on the basis of nationality. Currently, only nationals from Burundi, Er-
itrea, Mozambique, Bahrain, Bhutan, Qatar, Syria and Yemen are eligi-
ble for relocation (Asylum Service 2016b). However, selection on this 
basis ignores the specific circumstances and identities that might ren-
der applicants of other nationalities eligible for international protection.  
Lastly, while the concept of integration may entail the recognition of 
the migrants’ specific identities in other national contexts, in Greek law 
it is conceptualised primarily as a process of socio-economic participa-
tion and familiarisation with Greek culture, history and language 
(Government Gazette 2014). As such, there is little in law to suggest 
conformity with the principle of mutual recognition. 
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Hungary and migration 
After the fall of the socialist system in Hungary, the first legal change 
was to quicken up the return of Hungarians living in the West who 
had left the country, or even those who may have lost citizenship due 
to restrictive policies (Hungarian National Assembly 1989). The Hun-
garian government assumed that the returning migrants were ethni-
cally Hungarian and refugees of repressive of political systems. Hun-
gary joined the Geneva Convention with geographic limitations in 
1989. Also Hungary received larger number of ‘refugees’ from neigh-
bouring countries, notably Romania, who crossed the border illegally 
and asked for asylum in Hungary due to ethnic and political repres-
sion in the sending country. Legislation had to be changed in 1993 by 
the effect of the war in Yugoslavia (from 1991) as the number of immi-
grants, asylum seekers radically increased and the regulations in prac-
tice failed to manage the situation. In 1993 the Act on the Entry, Resi-
dence and Settlement of Foreigners in Hungary or ‘Aliens’ Act’ (Hun-
garian National Assembly 1993b) came into force to tighten the 1989 
law. Finally, in 1998 an Act on Asylum entered into force (Hungarian 
National Assembly 1997), which ended the geographical limitations 
for refugees and specified the three categories of refugees applying to 
the Hungarian case with different procedures and rights. 
During the EU pre-accession period, national rules and legislations on 
migration were adapted in order to harmonize with EU legislations 
and norms. The 2001 Act on the Entry and Residence of Foreigners 
(Hungarian National Assembly 2001) which was the legal basis of the 
free movement of EU citizens in Hungary, divided the legal status of 
immigrants into EU citizens and third-country nationals. In 2004 join-
ing the EU both regulations and the institutional system of migration 
issues were transformed. In 2007 Hungary joined the Schengen Zone 
and thus complete freedom of movement was introduced. In the same 
period Hungary also introduced complete freedom of employment for 
EEA citizens. At the same time (between 1999 and 2011) Hungary in-
troduced a special system for people in EU countries and Third Coun-
tries with historical and ethnic ties for gaining special privileges in mi-
gration and gaining citizenship outside the border of Hungary. 
Terms, definitions and concepts: peculiarities of the 
Hungarian case 
The Hungarian legal documents do not refer to ‘migrants’, but to per-
sons with varying specific legal status allowing several forms of 
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longer-term residence. The usage of the more international notion of 
‘migrant’ (‘migráns’) has only gained momentum in non-legal dis-
courses (public and media discourses) in the wake of the ’migration 
crisis’ of Europe. The Hungarian legal system defines the main types 
of migration (‘bevándorlás’) in reference to the EU legislation. In addi-
tion, it intends to provide exclusive rights to third-country and EU na-
tionals with Hungarian background. Four main types of migrants are 
recognized in the Hungarian law: the asylum seekers and beneficiaries 
of international protection (Hungarian National Assembly 2007c), the 
EEA citizens (Hungarian National Assembly 2007a, act I), and the 
third-country citizens, except asylum seekers (Hungarian National As-
sembly 2007b), and the ‘Hungarians abroad’ (co-ethnic Hungarians 
living outside of the country). 
The Hungarian legal system uses the term ‘illegal migration/migrants’ 
instead of ‘irregular’, but it does not refer to ‘legal’ or ‘regular migra-
tion/migrants’; here the focus of the related acts is on the process of 
permissions and visas. Hungary follows different treatments in terms 
of rights according to categories of legal immigrants. 
A residence permit in Hungary is provided on humanitarian grounds for 
various reasons: for a person recognized as a stateless person or as an 
exile (beneficiary of tolerated stay – ‘befogadott’); for any third-coun-
try national who has applied to the refugee authority for asylum or for 
subsidiary form of protection or temporary protection; any third-coun-
try national who was born in the territory of Hungary who has fallen 
from the custody of his/her guardian having custody according to 
Hungarian law, as well as unaccompanied minors. Moreover, resi-
dence permit is granted on humanitarian grounds to third-country na-
tionals who cooperate with the law enforcement authorities in fighting 
crime, in addition to those who have been subjected to particularly ex-
ploitative working conditions, or to third-country national minors who 
were employed illegally without a valid residence permit or other au-
thorization for stay. 
Particularly interesting seems to be the understanding of family mem-
bers for family reunification purposes, although there is a differ-
ence/between those who enjoy the right of free movement (EEA na-
tionals and their family members) and third-country nationals. In the 
latter case, the definition of ‘family member’ refers to the spouse, the 
minor child in common with his/her spouse, the minor child of 
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his/her spouse (also including adopted child in both cases). Neverthe-
less, even dependent parent(s), sibling(s) or other direct relative(s) may 
be granted residence permit for family reunification purposes if 
he/she is unable to care for him/herself due to his/her health status. 
In case of refugee’s family members (that also includes the parent of a 
minor refugee) the above-mentioned kinships are recognized even in 
the lack of documentation proving the family relationship, except for 
the marriage with the spouse which must have occurred prior to the 
arrival of the refugee. The validity of the residence permit issued for 
family reunification could not be longer than the residence permit of 
the sponsor. In the case of EEA nationals, the definition is even wider. 
In addition to the above-mentioned groups, it also refers to civil part-
ners and to ‘those who have been granted residence by the authority as 
family members’ (Hungarian National Assembly 2007a, Art. 2, par. bh). 
Unaccompanied minors, a particularly vulnerable category, may never 
be detained. In case of an unaccompanied minor whose application 
was rejected, besides the fundamental guarantees for non-refoulement 
return may not be implemented except for family reunification or 
(public) institutional care, which is provided in the country of origin.  
If this condition is not met, only the unaccompanied minors receive a 
humanitarian residence permit. 
The Hungarian legal system distinguishes four types of protection 
which are concerned with Refugee status in the EU law. These are the 
refugee (‘menekült’), the beneficiary of subsidiary protection (‘ol-
talmazott’), the beneficiary of temporary protection (‘menedékes’), and 
tolerated stay (‘befogadott’). Of particular interest, the ‘tolerated stay’ 
is granted for ‘a foreigner not complying with the criteria for recogni-
tion as refugee or beneficiary of subsidiary protection but, in the event 
of his/her return to the country of origin, s/he would be exposed to a 
risk of persecution for reasons of race, religion, ethnicity, membership 
of a particular social group or a political opinion or to behaviour’ 
(Hungarian National Assembly 2007c, Section 25/A). The refugee au-
thority recognizes somebody as a person with tolerated stay if the pro-
hibition of refoulement has been established in the immigration proce-
dures, or the application for asylum has been rejected, but the prohibi-
tion of refoulement has been established. 
Before 2010 the Hungarian immigration policy on beneficiaries of in-
ternational protection was rather permissive concerning obligations or 
optional provisions stemming from EU law. From 2010 onward the 
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Hungarian legislation has become steadily stricter. Within the frame-
work of EU directives of the Common European Asylum System, it 
means that Hungary transposed mainly the stricter rules from the Ac-
quis, such as asylum detention that was introduced in 2013. The person 
granted refugee status, or subsidiary protection, receives a national 
identity card (not a residence permit), and the refugee/subsidiary pro-
tection status has to be revised every three years. The Immigration and 
Asylum Office (IAO) is responsible for the asylum procedure, and the 
integration of the beneficiaries of international protection. Neverthe-
less, the IAO is also the immigration authority, not only the asylum 
authority. This centralized administration means a unified application 
of law on the one hand, but it also means that the local authorities have 
no role in the process. 
The basic rights, benefits and material conditions are the same for both 
‘regular’ applicants and those who are put under asylum detention 
(Hungarian National Assembly 2013, Section 89). Furthermore, in line 
with the EU Directive, detention should be a last resort. Still, in practice 
in Hungary, (asylum) ‘detention became a key element in the Govern-
ment’s policy of deterrence’, UNHCR observed (UNHCR 2016c). The 
difference regarding the right to the provided benefits lies between 
those who are indigent (in case of first-time applicants, the reception 
with all the benefits is free of charge) and those who are not, or later 
proven to have concealed their financial possibilities (they either have 
to pay or refund later). Since 2015, applicants, who are not in detention, 
are also entitled to join the Hungarian public work programme (Hun-
garian National Assembly 2015a). Furthermore, after nine months, asylum-
seekers may work under the general conditions applying to foreigners. 
Reception of asylum applicants is organized around three types of fa-
cilities: reception centres (‘befogadó állomás’), community shelters 
(‘közösségi szállás’) and guarded asylum reception (detention) centres 
(‘menekültügyi őrzött befogadóközpont’). The possibility of private 
accommodation is also given but is in practice atypical. The Asylum 
Act also identifies persons with special needs: ‘unaccompanied chil-
dren or vulnerable persons, in particular, minor, elderly, disabled per-
sons, pregnant women, single parents raising minor children or per-
sons suffering from torture, rape or any other grave form of psycho-
logical, physical or sexual violence’ (Hungarian National Assembly 
2007c). Persons under these categories are provided special treatment 
throughout the whole process. Those, who do not apply for asylum 
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and enter Hungarian territory illegally, or who overstayed and lack 
appropriate documents, are dealt with by the aliens policing authori-
ties (See Hungarian National Assembly 2007b; and Hungarian Gov-
ernment 2007). They are treated separately both when it comes to pro-
cess and detention facilities (alien policing detention centres).  
As the number of asylum-seekers started to increase significantly in 
Hungary in the middle of 2015, the reception system underwent some 
important changes. Simultaneously to completing the border fence and 
sealing the green border, the Government introduced the so called 
‘transit zones’. These zones were established at the southern border of 
Hungary (in Tompa, Röszke, Beremend, and Letenye, the latter two at 
the Hungarian-Croatian border did not operate). In the transit zones, 
asylum and immigration authorities, and the security services are pre-
sent. This is where applicants for asylum are registered, and primary 
interviews are conducted. In case of applicants who do not belong to 
any of the vulnerable groups, a specific accelerated procedure, the so-
called border procedure, is conducted. Transit zone resembles the 
hotspots in its functioning (accelerated procedure and all its possible 
shortcomings). As from the summer of 2015, with daily arrivals reach-
ing 6 or even 11 thousand people, the authorities established tempo-
rary facilities - sometimes also referred to as ‘transit zones’, which may 
have caused confusion - in the capital (at, and in the proximity of, main 
railway stations) throughout the summer period until September. 
After having established it in 2010 and following the criticism of UN-
HCR and the European Commission, the Hungarian asylum authority 
ceased to apply the ‘safe third-country’ concept in 2012. The situation 
became more controversial when the Hungarian government, strug-
gling with the inflow of asylum-seekers in the summer of 2015, went 
further in codifying this policy by publishing the list in a decree (Hun-
garian Government 2015b), that named the safe third countries. The 
list included: all EU Member States, EU candidate countries (except 
Turkey, which was added to the list later, in Government Decree 
63/2016, following the EU-Turkey deal – (Hungarian Government 
2016)), Member States of the European Economic Area, US States that 
do not have the death penalty, Switzerland, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ko-
sovo, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.  
In September 2015, struggling with the management of the situation, 
Hungary was also offered ‘hotspot assistance’ by the Commission, 
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which was, turned down by the government shortly after (Hungarian 
Government 2015a). Behind this move were two basic convictions: 
first, that Hungary is not a ‘frontline state’ in the sense that asylum-
seekers reach its territory only after having already been in another EU 
Member State, namely Italy or Greece (this can be important when it 
comes to executing transfers based on the Dublin Regulations). Sec-
ond, that migration should not be simply ‘handled’, it should be 
stopped. According to government officials, the whole hotspot system 
design builds on an opposing conviction, with different relocation and 
resettlement options, and with setting up the hotspots themselves 
within the territory of the EU. 
An interesting point on the understanding or misunderstanding of dif-
ferences between resettlement and relocation happened on February 
2016, when the prime minister announced that Hungary should hold 
a referendum on whether the country should accept the proposed 
mandatory quotas of ‘settling’ (the expression he used was not ‘reloca-
tion’ or ‘resettlement’, but ‘settling’ or ‘settlement’). The aim of the ref-
erendum was to contest the obligatory distribution of asylum applica-
tions, (mis)interpreted by the referendum and the government as a 
mandatory relocation system. As we can see, the EU decision in 2015 
was about ‘relocation’ and the translation of the referendum question 
into English used the word ‘resettlement’. However, the question was 
about future obligatory settling/settlement or, more precisely, forced 
settlement. As everyday people - even the media - do not have 
knowledge or experience about the differences between the two concepts 
(or even three: ‘relocation’, ‘resettlement’ and ‘settlement’) – nor is it de-
fined in any Hungarian legal documents, the goals and effects of the EU 
decision about relocation or resettlement could easily be misunderstood.  
Observations on the three understandings of justice from 
the Hungarian case 
Justice as non-domination 
In the case of Hungary, the problem of dominance appears basically 
on two territories of legal and institutional arrangements. On the one 
hand, the problem is given by some arbitrary actions, procedures and 
arrangements of the Hungarian state for limiting access to interna-
tional protection by third-country nationals. On the other hand, we 
find arbitrary actions of the Hungarian state introducing extraterrito-
rial naturalization without consulting the concerned states, such as the 
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procedures and arrangements concerning third-country nationals with 
historical-ethnic ties to Hungary. 
In the first case, the Hungarian state gave way to, and engaged in, 
dominating practices vis-à-vis individuals and third states alike by ac-
tions, such as making amendments to existing law in Act CXL of 2015 
(which included the criminalization of the ‘crossing of the border clo-
sure’) (Hungarian National Assembly 2015b), the legally questionable 
implementation of the accelerated border procedure (violation of hu-
man rights), and the introduction of a state of exception in case of crisis 
situation caused by mass immigration, or bringing in new legal ar-
rangements, such as the concept and listing of safe third countries. 
Along with this, the state managed to effectively exclude some poten-
tial asylum-seekers from enjoying their internationally guaranteed 
rights, and arbitrarily altered a sensitive, interstate legal procedure, 
that impaired the interests of a third state, namely, Serbia. Act CXL of 
2015 is also noteworthy because of the introduction of the concept of 
‘crisis situation caused by mass immigration’, a kind of state of excep-
tion in the Agambenian sense, in which legal guarantees of non-domi-
nation may be suspended, allowing the government to use exceptional 
measures, and disregard important laws. Also Hungary is trying to block 
the return of asylum seekers to Hungary within the Dublin system. 
Concerning the second category of dominance, as of Act XLIV of 2010, 
ethnic Hungarians can be naturalized on preferential terms (Hungar-
ian National Assembly 2010). This act was aimed at the unification of 
the Hungarian nation in its symbolic sense, including those ethnic 
Hungarians who have been excluded since the Treaty of Trianon 
(1920), which after World War I, distributed two thirds of the historic 
Hungarian territories among the neighbouring countries. The highly 
political decision was contested among these countries, specifically for 
those prohibiting dual citizenship, and thus caused tensions in the bi-
lateral diplomatic relationships. 
As a way to understand that, we have to be aware that this situation was 
partially produced in a context where states are formally equal partners, 
but practically are in complex, and highly unequal relationship with each 
other even in terms of being integrated into migratory global flows. With-
out a deeper analysis of the frustrations this caused, we can safely assume 
that the recent Hungarian rhetoric and policy of dominance is not just a 
factor of political will, but also structural processes behind. The Orbán 
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government’s address of this issue – for the first time since Hungary’s 
accession – has been verbally hostile against the EU ‘dominance’ since 
its 2010 inauguration. The ‘migration crisis’ provided an excellent op-
portunity for further criticisms of the incorrect policies invented and 
enforced by EU bureaucrats. The most conspicuous issue was the 
‘forced settlement quota’. Interpreting policies laid down in the Coun-
cil Decision 2015/1523 (Council 2015b) as arbitrary interference in 
Hungarian sovereignty, the government brought ‘external domina-
tion’ directly in the middle of the question. Nonetheless, we have to be 
aware that the Hungarian position within the EU also holds the risk of 
being dominated by other actors who have vastly different institution-
alized practices and historical migratory processes than that of Hun-
gary who has been both an emigrant and has just received migrants 
from neighbouring countries.  
Justice as impartiality 
The principle of impartiality is endangered in various ways in Hun-
gary, most notably in: i) The lack of integrated view on the various cat-
egories of migrants in migration policy documents and the lack of the 
implementation of any complex strategy of integration of migrants; ii) 
The establishment a four pillar system which contains various hierar-
chies and priorities with differential procedures among and within cat-
egories of migrants. In Hungary until September 2013 there was no 
governmental Migration Strategy - which could have provided some 
normative principle to the various categories of migrants. Although its 
adoption could be considered positive, there were also some critical aspects 
from the point of view of impartiality: 
1. It could not integrate all the processes of migration, most im-
portantly immigration and emigration which could have given 
a basic impartial perspective of handling together the rights of 
outgoing ’Hungarians’ and incoming ‘foreigners’.  
2. The document promised the construction of a universal per-
spective for an integration strategy for all migrants but this has 
not been adopted ever since. 
3. The migration strategy stated that Hungary supports and facil-
itates all forms of legal migration, although official communi-
cation of the government from 2015 blatantly contradicts this 
principle. 
4. Lack of monitoring and evaluation of the strategy.  
(UNHRC 2016d)   
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The Hungarian institutional system is built on four, hierarchical pillars 
(Melegh 2016). The state clearly aims at the priority to ensure full rights 
to Hungarian minorities living outside the country. There are certain 
privileges, the most important one is that Hungary provides full citi-
zenship for those who can prove that he/she had a Hungarian ancestor 
born in the territory of (historical) Hungary (Hungarian National As-
sembly 2010). Another pillar of the policy is the category of EU and 
EEA citizens benefiting from free movement (of persons and labour) 
based on the EU law. The third pillar is the third-country nationals 
who are treated in accordance with EU policies/legislation with re-
gards to third-country nationals. The fourth pillar refers to those seek-
ing international protection and/or crossing the borders of Hungary 
in an irregular manner whose rights were strictly tightened in 2015 and 
2016 as an answer to the migration crisis. The hierarchical treatment of 
the different ‘types’ is a sign of the lack of impartial treatment.  
Justice as mutual recognition 
Justice as mutual recognition refers mainly to integration policies and 
the recognition of cultural and social diversity. Three areas where jus-
tice as mutual recognition is clearly in danger are:  i) The unequal ac-
cess to nationality and thus the preferential treatment which reduces 
the institutional capacities toward immigrants without historic-ethnic 
ties to Hungary; ii) The unequal recognition of migrants who do not 
form an accepted ‘historical minority’ which enjoy certain legal and 
cultural support having that status; iii) The lack of institutionalized 
recognition of cultural diversity.  
With regard to the access to nationality the key problem is not the pref-
erential treatment of certain groups, but the withdrawal the institu-
tional capacities handling the application for nationality of other mi-
grants. Since 2011 the Hungarian government has channelled most of 
its institutional resources helping the privileged group while resources 
has been dramatically reduced for the other groups. The EEA migrants 
enjoy the social and political rights that come with EEA citizenship 
(Melegh and Feischmidt 2013). The formation in the early 1990’s of a 
privileged zone of ‘Europeans’ as a governmental priority with a ‘club 
logic’ is reinforced with the appearance of increasing number Hungar-
ian emigrants directed mainly to EEA countries since 2004 (Melegh 
2016). As said, the co-ethnic Hungarians originating from EU and non-
EU Member States have favourable conditions at all levels of the im-
migration process. Howsoever, these special treatments of mutual 
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recognition are not out of political aspiration since it entitles national 
level voting rights for them. The mutual recognition of immigrants 
with ethnic backgrounds of historical minorities is more favourable than 
other TCNs because they could have well established autonomy on a 
local governmental level and organizations which facilitate their socio-
cultural recognition and integration. At the same time they enjoy pref-
erential treatment in accessing local and national media and various 
forms of cultural funds. They also enjoy certain privileges of political 
representation on a national level. However, the other TCN groups re-
ceive no institutionalized support such as language and vocational 
training, or housing support. 
The mutual recognition as regards to cultural diversity is institutional-
ized only in a limited way. There is a clear hierarchy of general recog-
nition of diverse cultural origins and identities. The Hungarian gov-
ernment is maintaining a repressive and assimilatory discourse of 
building a homogeneous nation. These homogenization efforts are also 
related to the structure of the historical migration processes Hungary 
has been experiencing. 
Norway and migration 
Norway is a somewhat exceptional country in Europe in political 
terms. It is one of the few European countries that are not members of 
the European Union. Rather it has structured its connections with Eu-
ropean institutions and organizations through membership in the Eu-
ropean Economic Area (EEA) and a host of other agreements and ac-
cessions to EU policies. Moreover, Norway has a long-standing tradi-
tion for active internationalism through the United Nations and its 
many organizations, as well as a forerunner in state-led foreign aid 
programs for developing countries. There has been considerable con-
sensus in Norwegian society and politics on this line of policy which 
has also been an integral part of the country’s foreign policy. 
The issue of migration was not high on the agenda in the first two dec-
ades of post-war politics and institution-building, perhaps not so sur-
prising as Norway for a long time was a country of emigration rather 
than one of immigration. In institutional terms, Norway was a signa-
tory to both the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights (1948) 
and the Refugee Convention (1951). In this sense, Norway institution-
alised basic principles such as the right to apply for asylum and non-
refoulement, that is the right not to be returned to country of origin in 
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cases of serious threats to life or freedom. Moreover, the regulation of 
foreigners and access to Norwegian territory was part of the budding 
Nordic cooperation of the 1950s. Through the signing of the Nordic 
Passport Union (1952) with the other Nordic partners (Denmark, Fin-
land, Iceland, and Sweden) Norway instituted passport-free travel in 
the region. In other words, Norwegian migration politics at this time 
did distinguish not only between citizens and non-citizens, but also 
accorded a special status to Nordic citizens through free movement 
across regional borders. 
Toward the end of the 1960s Norway started to see an increase in mi-
gration. This happened conjunctively with a larger European trend of 
increased labour migration both internally in Europe as well as from 
countries outside Europe (Messina 2007). This new wave of migrants 
was almost exclusively labour migration to low-skilled jobs. The main 
sending countries of migrants to Norway were Pakistan, Turkey, Yu-
goslavia and other countries in Southern Europe (Kjelstadli, 
Tjelmeland and Brochmann 2003). This wave of migrants was wel-
comed as there was a surplus of jobs in Norway’s budding oil econ-
omy. Nevertheless, after some years, labour unions and political actors 
argued for the need to curtail and regulate labour migration to protect 
the labour market for Norwegians. Thus, in 1975 Norway instituted a 
halt to open labour migration (‘innvandringsstopp’). 
In the 1980s and 1990s, then, migration to Norway was mainly by ref-
ugees through the UN refugee quotas and asylum seekers. The Balkan 
War ushered in new migrants from that part of Europe, while in the 
latest wave of migration there was an increase in refugees and asylum 
seekers during and in the aftermath of the wars in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. Moreover, in the period from 2014-2016 Norway also saw its 
share of the increased migration to Europe on the back of the Syrian 
civil war and increased geopolitical tensions in the Middle East. This 
latest development led to extensive debates on asylum policies, recep-
tion of asylum seekers, and the future of integration policies. 
Overall, Norway’s approach to migration has been law-based, partly 
based on international conventions and on domestic laws covering dif-
ferent aspects to access to Norwegian territory. The territorial notion 
to migration has been strong. The Immigration Act focuses in this 
sense much on territorial access. Nevertheless, there has been a ten-
dency in recent years toward a more comprehensive approach. This 
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means that access, integration once residence is established, and citi-
zenship policy has been seen as part of one more coherent policy field. 
Terms, definitions and concepts: the peculiarities of the 
Norwegian case 
Norwegian law on migrants is regulated through different legislative 
arrangements. The Immigration Act (Utlendingsloven 2016) is the 
main piece of legislation which regulates the entry to national territory 
of foreigners and their eventual residence there. There are also certain 
regulations (‘forskrift’) that the Government and its Ministries can is-
sue that do not need to go through the legislative process, but need to 
be in accordance with existing law. Finally, Norwegian migration law 
exists in a context of European law as well as human rights conven-
tions and other international treaties. As an EEA member, Norway is 
bound by the EU treaties where these apply. In the case of migration, 
this has specific consequences for labour and economic migration to 
Norway due to the rights attached to free movement. Moreover, Nor-
way has decided to take part in the Schengen system of passport-free 
travel in Europe as well as the Dublin system on asylum applications. 
The European Convention on Human Rights and other more specific 
human rights codes have also been part of Norwegian law since 1999. 
The domestic laws and principles on migration are, then, bound by 
these pieces and principles of international and supranational legislation. 
While clearly regulating migration, the Immigration Act does, how-
ever, not make use of the term ‘migrant’, rather it is based on the word 
‘foreigner’ (utlending) which is also part of the very title of the law. 
The term ‘migrant’ is, then, not clearly defined as such in the Immigra-
tion Act, yet the law regulates a host of different aspects of migration 
to Norway. The law defines a foreigner as anyone who is not a Norwe-
gian citizen.  The law stipulates in order to give the grounds for regu-
lation and controlling access and exit from Norwegian territory and 
the stay of foreigners. Crucially, the law states that this should be in 
accordance with Norwegian migration policy and international obli-
gations. In other words, the law is not standing on its own: it needs to 
be seen in accordance with broader policy-making. Moreover, the law 
clearly states that it is to facilitate legal movement across national bor-
ders. In this sense, the law defines a migrant as someone who enters 
Norwegian territory legally. From this follows that Norwegian migra-
tion law is focused on legal migrants and legal migration. There is no 
self-standing law on ‘illegals’. Rather, the main law on migrants and 
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foreigners gives the rules and regulations under which different cate-
gories of migrants can have access to Norwegian territory and follow-
ing this take up residence, first temporary and then possibly permanent. 
Observations on the three understandings of justice from 
the Norwegian case 
Justice as non-domination  
It is obvious that Norwegian asylum policy as it has been defined in 
this report is at least close to the least demanding conception of justice, 
that is, justice as non-domination. A main principle in the legal defini-
tions of asylum seekers and refugees is that the categories for protec-
tion should be clear. Moreover, there is clearly an effort in the legisla-
tion to avoid arbitrary decisions that may harm some individuals more 
than others. The more demanding conceptions also fall by the wayside 
when we look at state-to-state relations in asylum affairs. This is for 
instance the case when Norway decides on so-called safe countries for 
returning migrants and failed asylum seekers. This is clearly not a sys-
tem where mutual recognition or impartiality is of significance. Nor-
way decides on safe countries based on information from LANDINFO 
which is an independent government agency. While the recommenda-
tions from LANDINFO rely on an array of sources, safe country deci-
sions have been disputed, both by the UN High Commissioner for Ref-
ugees (Crouch 2016) or by official representatives of sending states 
such as Afghanistan (Berglund 2016) In this sense, Norway seemingly 
does not adhere to the reciprocity which forms the core of the justice 
as mutual recognition as it can be doubted whether it has sought to 
‘(…) establish cooperative arrangements and active dialogues with af-
fected parties in order to determine what would be the right or best 
thing to do in any given circumstance’ (Eriksen 2016, 20). 
Justice as impartiality and justice as mutual recognition  
Given Norway’s increasingly strong interconnectedness with the EU 
and EU legal principles, one can argue that its migration law in part 
approximates a notion of justice as impartiality. Economic migrants in 
Norway are basically EU or EEA citizens who exercise their rights un-
der EU law. Rights to free movement and the principle of non-discrim-
ination based on nationality are part of the Norwegian migration re-
gime. There is no ‘universal’ right to economic immigration to Nor-
way: it is limited to EU and EEA citizens. In this sense, in terms of eco-
nomic migrants, we cannot deem this too close to a notion of justice as 
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mutual recognition in a global sense. It is a territorial extension of rights 
to the transnational realm, where the notion of national belonging is 
less prevalent for rights attribution. While transnational, it is, however, 
still limited only to European citizens. Arguably, this transnationality 
falls somewhere between the first two notions of justice as non-domi-
nation or impartiality. Clearly, the principle of non-discrimination 
based on nationality rests on an understanding of a negative freedom 
where, for instance, a worker should be exempt from arbitrary disad-
vantage in the labour market as a result of their nationality. Yet, it is 
also clear that this does not extend to a cosmopolitan law for all in a 
universal sense which would be a requirement to meet the basic pre-
cepts of justice as impartiality. The definition of economic migrants in 
Norway, through the ‘EEA connection’ is quasi-cosmopolitan in its ex-
tension of rights to non-citizens with EU citizenship or nationality in 
an EEA country, yet falls short of universality in a true cosmopolitan 
sense. Rights as economic migrants in this Europeanized setting are 
not human rights: they are transnational rights which extend the terri-
torial remit of rights considerably. 
 
 
